

2025

WEST PHILIPPINE SEA

Annual Report



Executive Summary

The Philippine government maintained a strong maritime presence near Bajo de Masinloc, significantly expanding vessel deployments for patrol and humanitarian missions. Despite these efforts, Filipino fishing boats remained barred from the shoal's waters, resulting in limited fishing activity. At the same time, the People's Republic of China (PRC or China) reinforced its anti-access strategy by increasing the China Coast Guard patrols and adjusting the operations of its maritime militia.

In the Kalayaan Island Group, the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) conducted a wide range of operations to reinforce the country's position and safeguard its maritime interests. These activities included maritime domain awareness flights, joint patrols with the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, and support for Philippine Navy escort missions to Ayungin Shoal. Nevertheless, Chinese vessels continued to act aggressively, shadowing Philippine ships and deploying aircraft, particularly near Pag-asa Cays. Philippine access to Escoda Shoal remained blocked, while the Navy's rotation and resupply missions to Ayungin Shoal continued under a so-called "provisional understanding" with China.

The PCG also closely monitored Chinese research and survey vessels transiting through Philippine waters and those engaged in unauthorized activities, including seabed mapping and the deployment of deep-sea submersibles. In response, the PCG mobilized aerial and maritime assets and issued radio challenges. However, the persistence of these operations underscored enforcement limitations and heightened concerns over China's maritime intentions, particularly near Taiwan and other critical sea lanes.

China's hybrid warfare, combining military pressure, paramilitary deployments, and disinformation, continues to undermine stability in the South China Sea and the wider Indo-Pacific. Through large-scale exercises and sustained information operations, China seeks to shape narratives and coerce states into relinquishing lawful maritime rights. In response, the Philippines has strengthened its maritime defense posture and expanded cooperation with like-minded partners, with the PCG supporting these efforts through joint exercises and regional engagements.

The West Philippine Sea Transparency Group has also played an instrumental role in informing the public, countering false narratives, and promoting maritime awareness. Through sustained media engagement, academic outreach, targeted radio campaigns, film screenings, and Track 1.5 dialogues, the organization has helped build national resilience and strengthen public support for the Philippines' maritime rights under both national and international law.



PART I: Bajo de Masinloc




FIGURE 1.1.
Vicinity map of Bajo de Masinloc or BdM (Panatag or Scarborough Shoal)

I. OVERVIEW

The year 2025 proved critical for Bajo de Masinloc (BdM), as China maneuvered to strengthen its projection of authority over the area. Most notably, it unilaterally declared portions of the shoal's rim as a national nature reserve. This act followed a widely publicized collision between a People's Liberation Army-Navy (PLA-N) destroyer and a China Coast Guard (CCG) cutter in the vicinity waters of the shoal during the pursuit of Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) vessel BRP SULUAN (MRRV-4406).

The Philippine government, meanwhile, maintained a steady projection of administrative authority in the West Philippine Sea near BdM by sustaining the successive deployment of PCG vessels, only partially disrupted by periods of inclement weather. However, both PCG vessels and Filipino Fishing Boats (FFBs) remained largely constrained from approaching the shoal's immediate vicinity, often kept as far as 24 nautical

miles from the shoal. The number of FFBs operating within and around the shoal's territorial sea substantially declined, reflecting a marked shift in local fishing practices compared to data from 2023 and 2024. In previous years, the period from March to May had been widely recognized as the peak shoal-fishing season.

The Kadiwa ng Bagong Bayaning Mangingisda (KBBM) initiative was activated in August, September, October, and December 2025, as local fisherfolk took advantage of pockets of favorable weather to fish closer to the shoal (FIGURE 1.2). Tensions persisted during these occasional Philippine humanitarian operations for Filipino fisherfolk conducted jointly by the PCG and Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR). Particularly, Philippine vessels were consistently subjected to intimidation tactics, including dangerous maneuvers, blocking, and the use of water cannons.

To enhance situational awareness, the PCG and BFAR increased the frequency of maritime domain awareness (MDA) flights directly over the shoal. These missions documented two new buoys, one inside the shoal's lagoon and another off its northwestern tip.

II. CHINESE VESSEL ACTIVITY

China continued to obstruct Philippine maritime operations within the territorial waters and contiguous zone of BdM, roughly 24.0 nautical miles from the shoal, by employing illegal, coercive, aggressive, and deceptive (ICAD) actions. These measures were often in response to the expanded presence of Philippine state vessels in the area.

During the first quarter of 2025, China recalibrated its anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy by increasing the number of CCG vessels carrying out routine patrols. Average daily CCG presence increased from three vessels in 2024 to around four to six vessels in 2025. On a monthly basis, the average number of deployed vessels reached 12, with activity peaking in November at 21 vessels (Figure 1.3).

CCG vessels typically maintain a five to six-week rotation cycle; however, by the third quarter of 2025, patrol durations lengthened to approximately six to nine weeks (ANNEX 1.7), facilitated by the presence of a PLA-N replenishment ship intermittently observed in the second half of 2025. China also irregularly deployed additional vessels to reinforce its forces, particularly in response to heightened activity by Philippine vessels and other foreign-flagged naval vessels from Australia, Canada, Japan, and the United States. These reinforcing CCG vessels stayed around the shoal for around two weeks. In total, the PCG detected more than 50 CCG vessels, including around 26 vessels monitored there for the first time.



FIGURE 1.2. On 16 September 2025, government-owned fish carrier M/V MAMALAKAYA provided assistance to around 30 FFBS near BdM

The deployment patterns of Chinese Maritime Militia (CMM) vessels in and around the shoal likewise changed, with the average number of monitored vessels ranging from five to ten (ANNEX 1.8). In the first quarter of 2025, a group of six QIONG SANSHA YU CMM vessels patrolled in rotation around the shoal, while YUE ZHAN YU 08044 and YUE ZHAN YU 08045, along with the suspected CMM vessel HAI 2, were intermittently observed inside. Beginning in late March, CMM vessel YUE ZHAN YU 08048 maintained a consistent position at the southwestern tip of BdM. However, between late May and early June, CMM activity scaled back, with the average daily sightings around the shoal dropping from six to five. As a result, the overall count of Chinese vessels declined. During this period, the PCG also reported no sightings of CMM vessels inside or at the southwestern tip. By the third quarter, groups of eight to ten CMM vessels were deployed.

Possible marine scientific research (MSR) activities around the area also increased. Throughout the year, the PCG monitored approximately 26 Chinese Research and Survey (CRS) vessels within 100.0 nautical miles of BdM. China claimed that some of these vessels were evaluating the condition of the marine environment of the shoal and its vicinity waters.




FIGURE 1.3. Bajo de Masinloc Vessel Monitoring, January to December 2025
Source: AIS, Physical monitoring, and Satellite Imagery

China also recalibrated its response to the Philippine government's expanded MDA flights over the shoal by deploying aircraft, such as helicopters and fighter jets, to shadow Philippine aircraft.

III. NOTABLE DEVELOPMENTS

Chinese entities engaged in ICAD actions, targeting Philippine surface and aerial deployments, as well as privately operated FFBs.



FIGURE 1.4. PLA-NAF 68 dangerously swerved towards RP-1077 on 18 February 2025, during an MDA flight over BdM

In 2025, the PCG recorded around 23 incidents involving FFBs and Chinese vessels. These encounters involved intimidation tactics, including shadowing, driving away, the pointing of searchlights, and the issuance of warnings through megaphones, sirens, horns, and verbal announcements. PCG MARPAT missions, meanwhile, were subjected to the issuance of radio challenges and shadowing movements from PLA-N, CCG, and CMM vessels. In the first half of 2025, CCG vessels used dangerous maneuvers to block PCG vessels more frequently.

Aggressive aerial response

On 18 February, a BFAR Cessna 208B Grand Caravan EX aircraft with tail no. RP-1077 was harassed during an MDA flight over the airspace above BdM. A Harbin Z-9 helicopter with tail no. 68, operated by the People's Liberation Army Naval Air Force (PLA-NAF), approached the aircraft at an extremely close distance, approximately 3.0 meters from its portside wing (FIGURE 1.4). This maneuver disregarded the safety of the crew and other civilians onboard, including journalists.



FIGURE 1.5.
Near collision between BRP CABRA and CCG-3302 in April 2025

Harassment of Philippine vessels

On 07 April, PCG vessel BRP CABRA (MRRV-4409) reportedly encountered at least eight dangerous maneuvers from CCG vessels. The closest of these involved CCG-3302, which came close to a head-on collision (FIGURE 1.5).

During a humanitarian mission for FFBS on 20 June, BFAR vessels encountered an aggressive response from the CCG, including repeated radio challenges, dangerous maneuvers at distances as close as 20 meters, and the use of water cannons. CCG-4203 fired its water cannon against the astern part of BRP MATANAM TARADAPIT (MMOV-3006), directly hitting the vessel, while executing dangerous maneuvers (FIGURE 1.6).

A similar pattern of conduct emerged during the activation of the KBBM initiative on 16 September, when PLA-N, CCG, and CMM vessels directed ICAD actions against BFAR vessels present in the area. These actions included radio challenges, the use of water cannons, as well as blocking and dangerous maneuvers. After being subjected to high-pressure water cannon blasts from CCG-5201, BFAR vessel BRP DATU GUMBAY PIANG (MMOV-3014) sustained significant physical damage, including a shattered bridge window and damage to the vessel's walls, engine, and onboard equipment (FIGURE 1.7). One BFAR personnel was also injured during the incident.



FIGURE 1.6.
CCG-4203 firing its water cannon towards BRP MATANAM TARADAPIT (MMOV-3006) while conducting dangerous maneuvers.



FIGURE 1.7.
Damage sustained by BRP DATU GUMBAY PIANG after being harassed by CCG-5201. Source: NTF-WPS




FIGURE 1.8. Location of PLA-N live fire exercises on 16 September 2025 based on coordinates provided by PLA-N 525



Despite these actions, BRP DATU GUMBAY PIANG was able to reach as close as 10.38 nautical miles east of BdM.

On the same date, the PLA-N 525 communicated with BRP CABRA through high-frequency radio, to warn of ongoing PLA-N maritime live-fire exercises in the sea area east of BdM. This move represented the first instance of China employing such a measure in response to Philippine government operations and presence (FIGURE 1.8).

Collision between PLA-N 164 and CCG-3104

On 11 August, BRP SULUAN provided security assistance during an activation of the KBBM program. During the operation, the PCG vessel was pursued at high speed by PLA-N 164 and CCG-3104 approximately 10.7 nautical miles east of the shoal. While attempting to chase BRP SULUAN, PLA-N 164 executed a dangerous maneuver that caused it to collide with CCG-3104, which had been shadowing the PCG vessel at close proximity. The collision severely damaged CCG-3104's forecastle and rendered the vessel unseaworthy (FIGURES 1.9 and 1.10).

Prior to the incident, monitoring indicated the presence of six CCG personnel positioned at the bow of CCG-3104. Following the collision, personnel were also observed overboard near the vessel. China, however, did not disclose any injuries or fatalities. PCG vessels BRP TERESA MAGBANUA (MRRV-9701) and BRP SULUAN immediately extended assistance, expressing readiness to aid injured personnel and recover those overboard.

Declaration of nature reserve

The third quarter of 2025 saw a significant geopolitical development when the State Council of China unilaterally and unlawfully declared a portion of BdM a nature reserve. In response, the



FIGURE 1.9.
CCG-3104 chasing BRP SULUAN at high speed with its water cannon turned on before colliding with PLA-N 164.



FIGURE 1.10.
PLA-N 164 colliding with CCG-3104 after conducting a dangerous maneuver.




FIGURE 1.11.
Location of so-called nature reserve with core and experimental zones. Source: AMTI-CSIS



FIGURE 1.12.
Yellow buoy, with solar panels and antennae, monitored inside BdM's lagoon, near the southeast entrance




FIGURE 1.13.
Yellow buoy, with antennae, monitored outside the northwestern end of BdM, like buoys recorded in the Yellow Sea

Philippine government filed a diplomatic protest through the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), while several like-minded states expressed support for the Philippines and rejected China's unilateral action.

On 10 September, following a request from the Chinese Ministry of Natural Resources, China State Council designated portions of BdM, referred to by China as "Huáng Yán Dǎo" or "Huangyan Island", as the Huangyan Dao National Nature Reserve. The declared reserve covers approximately 35.2 square kilometers (3,532 hectares), encompassing the northern and

western rim of the shoal. The designation provides for the subdivision of the reserve into core and experimental zones, with the core zone comprising the feature itself. The majority of the lagoon, as well as the eastern and southern portions of the shoal, including the southeastern entrance, are excluded from the declaration. The DFA has since lodged a diplomatic protest on 12 September, strongly objecting to China's action.

Like-minded partners, including Australia, Canada, Japan, the United States, and the European Union, released statements voicing support for the Philippines, respect for the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and disputing China's claims.

Monitoring of newly installed buoys inside and around BdM

PCG Britten-Norman Islander aircraft with tail no. 4177 (PCG 4177) was deployed on 13 October to conduct an MDA flight over BdM. PCG personnel onboard observed a floating, cylindrical yellow object, with an antenna and solar panels on its superstructure, inside the shoal's lagoon (FIGURE 1.12). Review of the images gathered indicated that the object is likely a real-time communications buoy.

PCG Cessna Grand Caravan aircraft with tail no. 2081 (PCG 2081) carried out another MDA flight on 15 October over BdM and monitored a new floating object at the northeastern portion of the shoal (FIGURE 1.13). Unlike the previously observed object, this buoy did not have solar panels attached to its superstructure. Both objects appear to be capable of transmitting data, as each is equipped with antenna-like components.




FIGURE 1.14. Monthly patrol days of Philippine vessels near BdM, 2024 and 2025

IV. PHILIPPINE EFFORTS

Steady deployment of maritime and aerial assets

For Philippine government operations, the PCG sustained successive maritime patrols (MARPATs) throughout the third quarter, only partially interrupted by periods of inclement weather.

The PCG successfully conducted 50 uninterrupted MARPAT missions, in addition to four joint MARPAT-humanitarian missions and four KBBM missions with the BFAR to assist fisherfolk operating in the WPS near BdM. PCG vessels primarily focused on shadowing and monitoring the presence and activities of foreign-flagged state vessels in the area. MARPAT operations were carried out on an almost daily basis, reflecting a substantial increase in frequency compared with 2024 (FIGURE 1.14). In total, PCG vessels maintained a presence in the area for approximately 289 patrol days, with absences occurring only during periods of rough sea conditions and severe weather.

These maritime efforts were reinforced by 31 MDA flights conducted by the Coast Guard Aviation Command (CGAvCom), as well as three joint MDA flights aboard BFAR aircraft.

Throughout these operations, the PCG consistently exercised its administrative authority by issuing regular radio challenges against the presence and activities of Chinese vessels, including those of the PLA-N, CCG, and CMM, as well as Chinese state aircraft.

Recalibrated radio challenge

In January, the PCG enhanced its radio challenge protocols by adopting updated scripts that incorporated inputs and recommendations from the Legal Action Working Group (LAWG) of the National Task Force for the West Philippine Sea (NTF-WPS).

The revised radio challenges emphasize Philippine rights as supported by both international and national laws. Vessels of interest, particularly CCG vessels, are firmly instructed to cease and desist from unlawful




FIGURE 1.15. Line graph comparing the number of monitored FFBs from 2023 to 2025

activities. Specifically, CCG vessels are warned against conducting illegal patrols within Philippine waters, including the Philippine Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The PCG also clearly states that all such incidents are formally documented and reported to higher authorities.

Humanitarian support for Filipino fisherfolk


The PCG and BFAR, in coordination with other local partners, conducted three humanitarian missions in March, May, and June. These missions provided logistical support, in the form of food packs and fuel subsidies, to at least 56 FFBs venturing near BdM. The support reduced the need for frequent returns to port for resupply, thereby enabling extended and more sustainable fishing operations. Coupled with the persistent presence of Philippine government assets in the area, these initiatives serve to strengthen fisherfolk confidence and encourage the continued exercise of their fishing rights within Philippine waters.

On 08 May, the PCG, in collaboration with BFAR, officially deployed the government-owned fish

carrier M/V MAMALAKAYA in the WPS near BdM under the KBBM program. The initiative seeks to establish a shore-to-market mechanism that reduces transportation and operational costs for local fisherfolk. During its soft launch, the fish carrier purchased approximately 20 tons of fresh fish catch from 10 FFBs operating in the area.

The PCG and BFAR subsequently activated the KBBM program on four occasions during the third and fourth quarters of 2025—once each in August, September, October, and December—based on the number of FFBs operating in the area (Figure 1.15).

For the August and September missions, BFAR deployed 10 vessels. The October mission involved two separate deployments with five and six vessels, respectively, while six vessels supported the December mission. These BFAR vessels provided logistical support in the form of fuel and food to FFBs. During the first three missions, the government-owned fish carrier M/V MAMALAKAYA also distributed additional provisions to fisherfolk (ANNEX 1.1 to 1.6).



FIGURES 1.16 (left). and 1.17 (right). Comparison between the location of FFB fishing operations in 2024 (left) and 2025 (right)




FIGURE 1.18 (left). Closest approach of PCG vessels (white triangle) and BFAR vessels (blue triangle) towards BdM during maritime patrol operations.

FIGURE 1.19 (right). Recorded locations where CCG (red) and PLA-N (yellow) ships were first monitored (triangle) and where they disengaged (x) from following Philippine vessels.

V. ANALYSIS

Diminished FFB activity around BdM

A comparative analysis of FFB activity within a 30-nautical-mile radius of BdM between 2024 and 2025 indicates a significant decline in the number of FFBs operating near the shoal (FIGURES 1.16 and 1.17). Notably, during the peak shoal fishing season from March to May 2025, no FFBs were recorded in the immediate vicinity of the shoal or within 1.0-nautical-mile radius.

This absence demonstrates that Filipino fisherfolk may have been deterred from fishing near the shoal, likely due to concerns about harassment or unlawful arrest by Chinese entities. Moreover, increased FFB activity near the 24- to 30-nautical mile mark of BdM coincided with joint humanitarian missions by the PCG and BFAR. This pattern emphasizes the importance of government presence and logistical support in encouraging local fisherfolk to operate in the area.



China’s recalibrated utilization of ICAD actions against Philippine vessels

China may have adapted its responses to Philippine operations around BdM, calibrating the severity of its actions based on the nature of Philippine activities and the level of presence in the area at any given time. For instance, while the PCG’s maritime patrols in the WPS near BdM have been more consistent throughout 2025, most patrols in the latter half of the year have not faced aggressive responses from the CCG or maritime militia, even as PCG vessels operated beyond 30.0 nautical miles off the shoal. This may suggest that China believes it has effectively contained PCG movements outside the 24.0 nautical mile mark (FIGURES 1.18 and 1.19).

CMM vessels were also withdrawn from patrolling inside the shoal during the first half of 2025, likely due to the limited presence of Philippine vessels and FFBS nearby, making continued CMM deployment unnecessary. This adjustment may reflect a practical and cost-effective measure, particularly as CCG vessels have successfully implemented China’s A2/AD strategy in the area.

August 2025 collision highlights miscommunication between PLA-N and CCG

The CCG’s use of close-quarter maneuvers and water cannons during the approach of Philippine vessels underscores China’s determination to prevent PCG and BFAR vessels from establishing a presence near the shoal. This led to the collision between PLA-N 164 and CCG-3104, which may have stemmed from a serious miscalculation by PLA-N 164.

Attempts to reshape the narrative following August 2025 collision

The incident involving PLA-N 164 and CCG-3104, which has been widely reported in traditional media and on social media, may have influenced the China State Council to unilaterally declare BdM as a nature reserve, as a show of strength and to maintain face. This declaration infringes on Philippine sovereignty, sovereign rights, and jurisdiction over the shoal and its surrounding waters, which Philippine national laws recognize as part of its territory. It also contradicts the 2016 Arbitral Award, which designated the shoal as a traditional fishing ground and affirmed the rights of Filipinos to fish in the area. The declaration likely aims to bolster Chinese vessels’ presence by providing justification for ICAD actions against Philippine vessels, while misrepresenting these actions as necessary for protecting the marine environment, allowing China to “save face”.

The nature reserve as a precursor to possible island-building activities

While the declaration intends to protect the marine environment of the shoal, Chinese entities have previously been documented by the PCG engaging in destructive activities in the area, including seabed scouring within the shoal’s lagoon and harvesting giant clams, top-shells, and other wildlife such as sea turtles. Furthermore, it is questionable that the reserve only encompasses the northern/western part of the shoal rather than its entirety. This may indicate potential plans for structures or island-building activities in the remaining unprotected areas of BdM’s reef.

PART II: Kalayaan Island Group




FIGURE 2.1. Philippine map indicating the location of features in the Kalayaan Island Group

I. OVERVIEW

In 2025, the PCG undertook strategic initiatives within the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) as part of a broader operational posture. These measures aimed to sustain and enhance the Philippines' maritime presence while reinforcing sovereignty claims in the West Philippine Sea, amid continuing external security challenges and the notable expansion of China's illegal activities in the region.

The PCG conducted 32 deployments, nine MDA flights, and participated in eight Philippine Navy (PN) rotation and resupply (RORE) escort missions to Ayungin Shoal. The PCG also carried out four separate marine scientific research initiatives, as well as 46 joint patrol deployments with BFAR. Together, these activities accounted for around 265 sea days.

This expansion of operations, building on the progress achieved in 2024, elicited increasingly

direct and assertive responses from Chinese vessels. Chinese state vessels consistently monitored PCG activities, while various PLA-N aircraft have been utilized to discourage Philippine operations, particularly in the vicinity of the Pag-asa Cays. Escoda Shoal has similarly remained a focal point of tension, as China continues to restrict access to the shoal following the extended deployment of BRP TERESA MAGBANUA (MRRV-9701) in 2024.

In contrast, the PN's RORE missions to Ayungin Shoal have adopted a more measured approach, prioritizing de-escalation. Despite these operational challenges, the PCG has remained resolute in maintaining effectiveness in its operations throughout the KIG region. Looking ahead to 2026, the PCG plans to sustain its efforts through gradual capability upgrades, enhanced interagency cooperation, and the implementation of more persistent and regular patrol operations.



II. VESSEL MONITORING

Chinese Vessel Monitoring

In 2025, the PCG recorded a higher count of China-flagged vessels, especially CMM vessels, in the KIG compared to 2023 and 2024 (FIGURE 2.2). The monthly average exceeded 600 vessels, up from over 350 in 2024. AIS data indicate a relative stabilization in vessel numbers, which may reflect both an increasingly overt demonstration of China's disapproval of Philippine operations and an overall expansion of its maritime activities. This increase is also partly attributable to the PCG's enhanced capabilities and intensified patrols, which surpassed those of prior years.

CCG vessels have been particularly active around Ayungin Shoal, frequently deploying Hulai-II and Hutao-II class ships (bow number series 21***), while other CCG vessels were consistently monitored operating near Escoda Shoal and adjacent areas. These vessel types, alongside CCG-5103, 5101, and 5102, exhibited the highest responsiveness to Philippine deployments, especially around Pag-asa Island. In 2025, the PCG logged more than 60 CCG vessels in the KIG, including at least 24 newly recorded CCG bow numbers operating in the region. This figure, collected through AIS, physical monitoring, and

satellite imagery, is higher compared to the 48 CCG vessels monitored in 2024.

Meanwhile, PLA-N vessels largely remained undetectable via AIS and the PCG primarily tracked them through physical monitoring and occasional MDA flights. Although PLA-N ships had limited engagement during PCG-specific operations, their presence projects operational strength. Several PLA-N aircraft were also utilized as active deterrents around Pag-asa Island since the April 2025 Global Times report documenting CCG personnel raising China's flag on Pag-asa Cay 1. In response, the PCG, in joint operations with BFAR, PN, and the Philippine National Police (PNP) Maritime Group, continued asserting Philippine claims, often encountering aggressive CCG behavior, including RHIB deployments and the use of water cannons.

MSR and alleged exploration activities also persisted in 2025. Observations from the first half of the year indicated interest in Philippine Archipelagic Sea Lane (ASL) routes following the enactment of Republic Act No. 12065 in late 2024, exemplified by Vessels of Interest (VOIs) deliberately transiting the municipal waters of Palawan.

In February, three PLA-N ships disregarded standard maritime protocols by failing to




FIGURE 2.2. Chinese Maritime Militia vessels in the Kalayaan Island Group from 2023 to 2025

Note: Fluctuations may partly be due to missing data




FIGURE 2.3. Chinese Maritime Militia vessels in the Kalayaan Island Group from January to December 2025 per KIG feature
 Notes: Fluctuations may partly be due to missing data
 "Total CMM vessels in KIG" Line represents possible unique vessels in the KIG, whereas the stacked bars include duplicates due to vessels visiting multiple areas within the period.

properly identify themselves when challenged during their passage from Mindoro Strait heading south. Shortly after, a CRS vessel LAN HAI 101 entered the Philippine EEZ from Port Klang, Malaysia, en route to Shandong, China. The vessel's reported reason for traversing the Sulu Sea was to avoid inclement weather west of Palawan.

In April, the PCG detected CRS vessel SONG HANG transiting through Mindoro Strait. After an initial failed radio transmission by PCG Aircraft RP-C251, BRP MALAPASCUA (MRRV-4403) intercepted the vessel approximately 32 nautical miles north-northeast of Mapun Island. The PCG confirmed that the vessel intended to pass through the Sibutu Passage en route to the southeast of the Indian Ocean to "catch fish".

A Shupang-Class AGS vessel of the PLA-N, identified as HAI YANG 22, was monitored roughly 36 nautical miles northwest of Cagayancillo Island on 07 June. The ship proceeded southward and departed Philippine

jurisdiction through Tawi-Tawi on 09 June. PN ship BRP GENERAL MARIANO ALVAREZ (PS176) shadowed the vessel, while the PCG deployed BRP CAPE SAN AGUSTIN (MRRV-4408) in the Balabac Strait as a precautionary measure in case it moved westward.

For 2025, the PCG tracked around 27 CRS vessels in the KIG, either transiting through the area or carrying out marine scientific research and related activities. Further details are provided in Part III.

CMM data indicate that 2025 activity surpassed levels recorded in 2023 and 2024 (FIGURE 2.2), particularly around China bases. Panganiban Reef recorded the highest concentration of vessels, peaking at around 290 unique vessels in July, followed by 280 in September, and almost 400 in November (FIGURE 2.3). Other hotspots included Pag-asa Island, Pagkakaisa Bank, and Kagitingan Reef, all of which showed notable vessel activity throughout the year.



Pagkakaisa Bank maintained relatively high vessel numbers since January, whereas Pag-asa Island experienced a decline after July. While CMM presence in Ayungin Shoal and Escoda Shoal remained minimal, these areas continued to receive regular patrols from CCG vessels (ANNEX 2.7) and PLA-N forces. Outside of Pag-asa Island, CMM activity in other Philippine-held features was limited, suggesting that surveillance in these areas relies primarily on alternative means rather than overt deployment of vessels.

Vietnam Vessel Monitoring

Consistent with trends observed in 2025, monitoring of Vietnam-flagged vessels operating within the KIG has increased. This rise corresponds with the PCG’s expanded monitoring efforts, which intensified the tracking and documentation of Vietnamese maritime activities in the region. The highest number of Vietnamese vessels in the KIG was recorded

during the fourth quarter of the year (FIGURE 2.4)

Many of these vessels appear to seek shelter during periods of changing weather conditions; however, their movement patterns also suggest a sustained and deliberate presence. Vietnamese fishing vessels continue to display irregularities in their AIS transmissions, frequently broadcasting incomplete or inconsistent data, which complicate efforts to accurately determine presence and intent. Physical monitoring has documented the routine presence of these fishing vessels within the territorial seas of Philippine-held features, including Lawak Island and Pag-asa Island.

Beyond fishing activities, monitoring efforts have increasingly focused on non-military maritime traffic, particularly dredger vessels. These vessels have drawn heightened scrutiny as potential indicators of broader operational activity in the region, especially amid reports of quiet




FIGURE 2.4. Kalayaan Island Group Vessel Monitoring, January to December 2025
Source: AIS, Physical monitoring, and Satellite Imagery

reclamation and infrastructure-support operations attributed to Vietnam.

IV. NOTABLE DEVELOPMENTS

Developments in Pag-asa Island and Cays

Throughout 2025, Philippine maritime and inter-agency operations in the Pag-asa Cays, particularly in the vicinity of Cay 2, took place amid a persistent presence of, and interference by, the CCG, CMM, and PLA aerial assets. These operations, which included BFAR patrols and Inter-Agency Maritime Operations (IAMO) conducted by law enforcement and military units based in Pag-asa Island, sought to assert and reinforce Philippine jurisdiction over the area.

Operations carried out early in the year, particularly in January, encountered the highest levels of resistance. BFAR MARPATs tasked with conducting research and collecting samples faced aggressive harassment. This included repeated radio challenges, siren and horn blasting, RHIB-to-RHIB intimidation, dangerous close-quarters maneuvering, water cannon use, and low-altitude deployment of PLA helicopters to deter landing and the collection of samples.

From April to June, IAMO missions aimed to reaffirm Philippine authority following China's flag-planting activities on Pag-asa Cay 2. While these missions achieved objectives such as visitation and documentation, several were disrupted by CCG blocking and chasing maneuvers, as well as aerial deployments. These actions led to partial mission aborts, particularly during attempts to proceed to Pag-asa Cay 3.



FIGURES 2.4 to 2.7. The Pag-asa Island Coral Restoration Project Phase 2 commenced on 28 May, starting with informational seminars for PCG personnel on the proper installation and measurement of coral plantations, alongside the physical deployment of coral frames and fragments in the southern region of Pag-asa Island.



Adverse weather conditions during this period further constrained some BFAR MARPAT operations.

By August, IAMO operations showed improved coordination and execution. Despite continued siren harassment and close monitoring by CCG and CMM vessels, Philippine teams landed on Pag-asa Cays 1 and 2, completed documentation, and achieved their mission objectives. Although the CCG maintained an assertive posture, the intensity of its actions diminished following the BdM incident on 11 August. This incident likely served as a calibrated test by China to assess Philippine responses and scenario outcomes within the broader bilateral context.

On 20 August, the PCG, together with a composite team, carried out an IAMO in the Pag-asa Cays (FIGURES 2.4 to 2.7). CCG-5103 activated its siren once after the Philippine team deployed rubber boats. The IAMO team successfully landed on Cay 2 and documented trash marked with Chinese and Vietnamese labels. Upon the team's return to Pag-asa Island, personnel aboard CMM vessel QIONG SANSHA YU 00121 were observed recording the operation. Mission personnel reported a restrained CCG response, marked by the absence of aircraft deployment, no overt acts of aggression, and distant shadowing. This contrasted with the IAMO conducted on 17 June, which involved drones, a helicopter, and active pursuit and obstruction by CCG RHIBs.

On 09 September, BFAR vessels BRP DATU BALENSUSA (MMOV-3009) and BRP DATU DUMANGSIL (MMOV-3012) departed Port Sual, Pangasinan. The BFAR vessels conducted MARPATs in Parola Island, Pag-asa Island, Panata Island, and Likas Island. CCG presence was first noted 51 nautical miles northeast of Likas Island, when CCG-21562 and 21559 began tailing the BFAR vessels. Interference escalated on 12 September as the BFAR vessels attempted to



FIGURES 2.8 and 2.9. Tugboat Manuel 3 and Barge Seasia 101 were approached and radio challenged by PLA-N 572 and 106 while underway approx. 22.9NM NE of Escoda Shoal. Source: Barge Seasia 101

approach the Pag-asa Cays, coinciding with the arrival of BRP TERESA MAGBANUA. During this encounter, CCG-21562 executed blocking and dangerous maneuvers as close as 20 meters, while CCG-21559 activated its water cannon in an indirect manner to threaten the BFAR vessels and force a halt to operations.

Blockade and illegal assertion of authority in Escoda Shoal

Similar to China's approach in the Pag-asa Cays, Chinese efforts to blockade Escoda Shoal against Philippine vessels heightened in 2025. Actions escalated from denying private vessels transit within 20 nautical miles of the shoal to the utilization of water cannons against both BFAR and civilian FFBs.

In July, government-contracted vessels Tugboat Manuel 3 and Barge Sea Asia 101 were approached and radio challenged by PLA-N 572 and 106 while transiting about 22.9 nautical miles northeast of Escoda Shoal. PLA-N 106 requested information on Sea Asia 101's cargo, flag state, crew nationality, and

port of destination. PLA-N 572 then conducted close-quarter maneuvers, approaching to within approximately 500 meters of Manuel 3's port side and shadowing the vessel for around 20 minutes (FIGURES 2.8 and 2.9).

In September, the PCG received reports that M/Tug Selene Gulf and barge Ark Star Energy, also government-contracted, en route to Pag-asa Island, were radio challenged by CCG-3302 roughly 12.44 nautical miles east-southeast of the same shoal.

Harassment continued later that the month, when BRP DATU MATANAM TARADAPIT (MMOV-3006) and BRP DATU GUMBAY PIANG were patrolling about 26.78 nautical miles south of Escoda Shoal. During this MARPAT, CCG-5201 executed dangerous maneuvers, while PLA-N 163 launched a medium helicopter roughly 3.0 nautical miles off the starboard beam of BRP DATU MATANAM TARADAPIT. Near 18.95 nautical miles southwest of Escoda Shoal, CCG-21550 joined the operation, closed to within 10 meters, and employed its water cannon, although indirectly, in the direction of BRP DATU MATANAM TARADAPIT. The CCG vessels also issued radio challenges directing the BFAR vessels to alter course.

In December, 20 FFBs from Quezon, Palawan reported that they were unable to approach and shelter inside Escoda Shoal as Chinese state vessels, such as the CCG, CMM, and PLA-N 571, tailed the



FIGURE 2.10. PCG rescue and assist harassed fishermen near Escoda Shoal

boats and eventually drove them away after they anchored inside the shoal. CCG and CMM vessels utilized high-pressure water cannons, injuring three fishermen (FIGURE 2.10) and damaging the wooden structures and parts of the indigenous fishing boats. Reports also indicated the deployment of CCG and PLA-N RHIBs, which deliberately cut the anchor lines of several FFBs.

IV. PHILIPPINE EFFORTS

Maritime environmental protection

In line with its mandate on marine environmental protection, the PCG's recently formed Marine Scientist Group (PCG-MSG) collaborated with the University of the Philippines-Marine Science Institute (UP-MSI) to implement conservation activities on Pag-asa Island. In February, BRP



FIGURES 2.11 and 2.16. PCG and UP-MSI team up for Coral Rehabilitation Activities



FIGURES 2.17 and 2.19. The PCG and PCSD conduct diving operations to assess the conditions of corals in the KIG.

MELCHORA AQUINO (MRRV-9702) facilitated the transport of personnel tasked with gathering samples for coral reef restoration and releasing about 100 turtle hatchlings along the shores of Pag-asa Island.

Formal activities under the Pag-asa Island Coral Restoration project commenced in May. These included educational seminars for PCG personnel on proper coral plantation installation and measurement techniques, as well as the deployment of coral frames and fragments in the southern sector of the island (FIGURES 2.11 to 2.16). These efforts marked the second phase of the island's coral rehabilitation program.

In addition to the UP-MSI project, the PCG also established a working arrangement with the Palawan Council for Sustainable Development (PCSD) to undertake maritime scientific research activities in the KIG. The initial mission, launched in June, concluded around mid-June following the inspection and assessment of possible damages linked to the grounding of CMM vessel QIONG LE YU 16838 in Pag-asa Reef 1 on 07 June (FIGURES 2.17 to 2.19).

KBBM Program

From 03 to 04 February, the PCG organized a Fishermen Congress in Puerto Princesa, Palawan, engaging 48 boat captains in a series of informative capacity-building sessions. The event served as a platform for dialogue among stakeholders and featured workshops designed to enhance the participants' preparedness for

maritime challenges. Attendees received essential medical training and were educated on environmentally sustainable fishing practices.

In June, in line with the KBBM program, PCG vessels BRP CAPE ENGAÑO (MRRV-4411) and BRP CAPE SAN AGUSTIN (MRRV-4408), together with 10 FFBS, BFAR's BRP LAPU-LAPU, and M/V MAMALAKAYA ventured towards the KIG to drop 20 fish aggregating devices (FADs) in the waters of Hasa-Hasa Shoal and Kanduli Shoal (FIGURES 2.20 to 2.23). The deployment aimed to improve fish catch and livelihoods for Filipino fishermen, while advancing the national government's KBBM objectives in the region.

This series of efforts by the Philippine government eventually led to the successes of the October and December missions. In December, the BFAR deployed 11 vessels with PCG personnel onboard to assist local fisherfolk operating in BdM and Escoda Shoal under the KBBM initiative. The mission was primarily prompted by the observed increase in FFBS monitored during the month. In December, the PCG dispatched BRP CAPE ENGAÑO (MRRV-4411) and BRP MALAPASCUA (MRRV-4403) in support of KBBM-related activities.

Despite sustained CCG aggression—escalating from radio challenges to dangerous maneuvers such as close-range bow crossing and route blocking, which delayed immediate responses to distressed Filipino fishermen subjected to water cannoning and harassment by Chinese state vessels in Escoda Shoal—the mission achieved its



FIGURES 2.20 to 2.23. On 14 June 2025, PCG vessels BRP CAPE ENGAÑO and BRP CAPE SAN AGUSTIN, together with 10 Filipino Fishing Boats, the BFAR's BRP LAPU-LAPU, and M/V MAMALAKAYA ventured towards the KIG to drop 20 FADs in the sea areas of Hasa-Hasa Shoal and Kanduli Shoal

objectives. The delivery of supplies enabled fishing operations to continue as planned, helping prolong fisherfolk activities ahead of the holiday season.

PN Rotation and Resupply mission

The PCG has conducted a total of nine escort missions in support of the PN RORE this 2025. The last PN RORE for the year, carried out in December, concluded successfully within a single day. However, during the mission, BRP MALAPASCUA (MRRV-4403) encountered sudden aggression around 12 to 13 nautical miles of Ayungin Shoal (FIGURES 2.24 to 2.25). CCG vessels 23520 and 23519 blasted their horns and sirens at the PCG vessel and activated their water cannons. This abrupt action was assessed to have been reactionary, likely influenced by concurrent developments in Escoda Shoal.

Overall, PN RORE escort operations in 2025 became more manageable, with most missions

concluding without incident. Activities in Ayungin Shoal increasingly followed more routine and de-escalatory measures, reflecting operational adjustments that emerged after developments in 2024. While the PCG recorded approaches as close as 11.0 nautical miles from the shoal, such proximity was typically achieved only after sustained CCG efforts to assert authority over Philippine maritime operations.

With each mission, China has increasingly enforced its demands by adjusting vessel deployments and/or issuing radio challenges, insisting that PCG vessels withdraw or cease activities.



V. ANALYSIS

The Philippines' sustained efforts in the KIG, particularly initiatives focused on marine environmental protection and programs on the development of fisherfolk communities, highlight the country's long-term investment and enduring commitment to the region. These activities signal not only continuity but also a deepening and normalization of Philippine activities. From the perspective of China, such developments may be interpreted as an escalation of the Philippines' level of engagement and a consolidation of influence, prompting China to respond preemptively to counter these developments from becoming entrenched.

Developments under the KBBM initiative that gained momentum in 2025 likely contributed to a noticeable increase in Chinese maritime presence in the KIG. These initiatives blend civilian livelihood support with recurring government operations, complicating CHINA efforts to challenge them without incurring reputational or escalatory costs. As a result, China appears compelled to create on-the-ground maritime realities that reinforce its claims and enhance its operational leverage. In this context, KBBM-related activities in Rozul Reef and Kanduli Shoal may emerge as potential flashpoints in 2026, especially if they are perceived as precursors to more permanent Philippine installations or activities, similar to those that evolved in Escoda Shoal and Ayungin Shoal. The increased visibility of CCG patrols in these areas during 2025 may reflect early positioning in anticipation of such scenarios.

At the same time, China is likely to exploit heightened media attention surrounding these developments as part of a broader information and influence campaign. By amplifying selective narratives, China may seek to portray Philippine actions as deliberately provoking tensions or causing long-term damage to the marine environment. This narrative framing plays on the limited public understanding of Philippine-led



FIGURES 2.24. to 2.25. December PN RORE mission, during which CCG-23519 activated its water cannon towards BRP MALAPASCUA.

initiatives, particularly those aimed at ecological rehabilitation and sustainable livelihood support. It also allows China to mischaracterize developmental and environmental activities as destabilizing and irresponsible.

These dynamics underscore the need for the Philippines to sustain investments not only in maritime presence and on-the-ground initiatives, but also in strategic communications. Through consistent engagement, transparency, and narrative clarification, the Philippines can counter misrepresentation, reinforce the legitimacy of its actions, and demonstrate that these efforts are rooted in responsible environmental stewardship and the lawful exercise of sovereign rights.

China's deployments in the KIG

The Chinese vessels' actions against PCG MARPAT missions have followed a largely routine pattern. From entry into the KIG through mission

conclusion, at least one Chinese state vessel has consistently maintained surveillance. This posture likely reflects a precautionary measure to prevent a possible repeat of a BRP TERESA MAGBANUA situation, when a PCG vessel remained in Escoda Shoal for an extended period without encountering immediate interference from Chinese authorities. A similar approach has been observed during BFAR maritime patrols, with China's level of aggression contingent upon verification of intended activities.

ICAD actions in 2025 have become more intentional compared to 2024, potentially in anticipation of developments stemming from the strengthened relationship between like-minded countries and the Philippines. Perceptions that increasingly favor the Philippines' position may also be contributing to China's heightened focus on Philippine maritime operations in the region.

The observed increase in the deployment of Hulai-II and Hutao-I class vessels in areas frequented by Philippine state vessels supports China's ICAD activities. These smaller, highly maneuverable platforms are well suited for close-range interception and harassment, while also providing China flexibility in shaping perceptions, such as attempts to portray the PCG as violating the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGs). Such intent is apparent in radio communications that seek to undermine the Philippine narrative and generate recorded exchanges that can be selectively repurposed in propaganda outputs.

These communications serve a strategic messaging function by provoking responses, capturing audio or video evidence, and reframing encounters to portray Chinese forces as restrained and law-abiding while depicting Philippine vessels as reckless or confrontational. Through this approach, China aims to assert dominance in both the physical maritime domain and the information environment surrounding these encounters.

On the PN RORE, Escoda Shoal, and Pag-asa Island Cays

The monotonous picture of operations in Ayungin Shoal highlights the limitations of adhering too rigidly to existing operational frameworks, including any "provisional understanding", that may disproportionately accommodate CHINA preferences and projection of authority. Over time, these operations have become increasingly standardized in ways that appear to facilitate CHINA operational ease, including restrictions on PCG access and maneuverability and the imposition of specific behavioral demands. As such, it is essential for the Philippines to adopt diverse approaches to discern what would most effectively serve the country's interests.

Meanwhile, the circumstances surrounding Escoda Shoal and Pag-asa Island are likely to evolve toward more unstable and contingent security environments. These areas continue to carry significant tactical and symbolic weight in the contest for maritime dominance. The incidents documented above indicate a rise in Chinese vessels' assertiveness, characterized by aggressive maneuvers within the territorial waters of Pag-asa Island and the Philippine EEZ more broadly. However, rather than representing a shift toward open confrontation, these actions may form parts of a calibrated pressure campaign intended to deter, signal resolve, and shape Philippine behavior.

Potential flare-ups in 2026 should therefore be viewed as situational rather than deterministic. CHINA actions are likely to be triggered by specific developments, such as Philippine infrastructure upgrades, expanded patrol or resupply activities, increased visibility of U.S. or allied forces, or diplomatic signaling perceived as consolidating Philippine claims. In this context, assertive maneuvers serve dual purposes: advancing operational objectives while delivering strategic messages aimed at influencing both Philippine decision-making and broader regional perceptions.

PART III: Other Maritime Areas




FIGURE 3.1. Historical track of monitored CRS vessels in 2025

I. OVERVIEW

Beyond monitoring BdM and features in the KIG, the PCG placed special focus on CRS vessels engaged in unauthorized marine scientific research activities in the Philippine EEZ, especially in the Luzon Strait and the Batanes area due to the country's proximity to Taiwan and the evolving security dynamics in the region.

In 2025, the PCG tracked around 46 CRS vessels transiting through Philippine territorial waters and the EEZ. Some of these vessels also conducted potentially dual-use scientific operations such as seabed mapping and the deployment of deep-sea submersibles without prior consent. These activities constitute direct violations of Philippine sovereignty under domestic laws and the UNCLOS. In response, the PCG deployed aerial and floating assets, and issued radio challenges to highlight and assert maritime rights and document and expose foreign incursions.

However, the persistent presence of these vessels demonstrates the country's enforcement gaps and raises concerns over the broader strategic implications of Chinese maritime activities, particularly regarding intelligence gathering and preparedness in sensitive areas.

II. CRS VESSEL ACTIVITIES

In February, the fisheries research vessel LAN HAI 101 sailed from Malaysia to Shandong, China, transiting through the Philippine EEZ (FIGURE 3.1). To avoid unfavorable sea conditions west of Palawan, the vessel opted to pass through the Sulu Sea. The PN confirmed that LAN HAI 101 complied with protocols while navigating through the country's archipelagic waters. BRP MELCHORA AQUINO escorted the ship as it passed north of Palawan and later directed BRP CABRA to intercept as it headed towards BdM (FIGURES 3.2 to 3.4).

LAN HAI 101 is owned and operated by the Yellow Seas Fisheries Institute, Chinese Academy of Fishery Sciences¹. It is equipped with onboard laboratories capable of collecting and analyzing samples for a range of missions, including fisheries resource survey, stock assessment, and ecological monitoring².

In April, the PCG detected SONG HANG, another fisheries research vessel, traversing the




FIGURE 3.2. Historical track of LAN HAI 101



FIGURES 3.3 and 3.4. LAN HAI 101 transiting through Philippine EEZ.

Mindoro Strait after departing Shanghai, China (FIGURES 3.5 to 3.7). To address and verify the vessel's intention and route, the PCG dispatched Islander RP-C251 and BRP MALAPASCUA. The PCG confirmed that SONG HANG planned to transit through the Sibutu Passage en route to the southeastern Indian Ocean.

SONG HANG is owned and operated by Shanghai Ocean University. The 85-meter vessel, built in 2017, supports pelagic fishery surveys, marine data collection, and environmental studies.^{3, 4}

In the same month, the PCG monitored three CRS vessels operating near the Batanes area, well within the Philippine EEZ. These vessels were identified as ZHONG SHAN DA XUE, DIAN KE 1 HAO, and ZHE HAI KE 1. In response, the PCG

deployed its Islander RP-4177 aircraft to conduct aerial surveillance, documenting the presence of ZHONG SHAN DA XUE (FIGURES 3.8 to 3.10). The PCG issued a radio challenge to the vessel, but received no response.

ZHONG SHAN DA XUE, owned by Sun Yat-sen University, is China's largest global-class oceanographic research vessel. Built mainly for research and educational missions, it measures 114.3 meters in length with a beam of 19.4 meters. It is capable of reaching a maximum speed of 14.5 knots and can conduct a 60-day voyage carrying up to 100 persons on board, including 26 crew members and 74 scientists^{5, 6}.




FIGURE 3.5. Historical track of SONG HANG



FIGURES 3.6 and 3.7. Aerial photos of SONG HANG




FIGURE 3.8. Historical track of ZHONG SHAN DA XUE

DIAN KE 1 HAO (ANNEX 3.9), owned by China Electronics Technology Group Corporation, is known as China’s first integrated electronic test ship equipped with advanced shipborne electronic systems. It provides navigation service support, integrated testing, engineering operation and maintenance, and information services, including data products for China’s military and police⁷. Meanwhile, ZHE HAI KE 1, owned by Zhejiang Ocean University, is built for general scientific research in the region⁸.

In May, the PCG dispatched Islander RP-829 to monitor the activities of another CRS vessel, TAN SUO SAN HAO (“Discovery 3”), off the coast of Ilocos Norte (FIGURE 3.11). PCG vessel BRP



FIGURES 3.9 and 3.10. Aerial photos of ZHONG SHAN DA XUE

TERESA MAGBANUA was also deployed to observe and shadow the vessel.

PCG personnel onboard both assets documented TAN SUO SAN HAO carrying unauthorized MSR activities within Philippine waters. The vessel launched a manned deep-sea submersible vessel, SHEN HAI YONG SHI or “Deep-Sea Warrior,” as well as a yellow rectangular survey equipment unit (FIGURES 3.12 to 3.13). The PCG issued multiple radio challenges, emphasizing domestic and international laws, particularly the Philippine Maritime Zones Act, UNCLOS, and the 2016 Arbitral Award.




FIGURE 3.11. Historical track of TAN SUO SAN HAO



FIGURES 3.12 and 3.13. TAN SUO SAN HAO conducting unauthorized MSR



TAN SUO SAN HAO is China's first deep-sea, multifunctional scientific research and archaeological vessel. Operated by the Institute of Deep-Sea Science and Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences, it entered service in December 2024. Along with IDSSE-CAS, the vessel is also supported by the Government of Hainan Province and the Development and Construction Limited Company of Sanya Yazhou Bay Science and Technology City. The CRS vessel is equipped with multidisciplinary scientific research facilities and can accommodate up to 32 crew members and 48 scientists. It is also considered an "icebreaker ship", capable of deploying deep-sea research submersibles, including Striver, Deep Sea Warrior, and Jiaolong, among others. The vessel has an overall length of 104.0 meters, a beam of 19.7 meters, a draft of 6.7 meters, and a displacement of 9,300 tons.⁹

In October, JIA GENG or TAN KAN HEE was monitored conducting research activities within the West Philippine Sea between 03 and 07 October (FIGURE 3.14). The vessel arrived in Ayungin Shoal on 03 October and carried out activities until 06 October. It then proceeded to Pag-asa Island by 07 October (FIGURE 3.15), passing by Malvar Reef and Kota Bank. JIA GENG's movements, which formed net-like patterns in Ayungin Shoal (FIGURE 3.14), suggest involvement in oceanographic and seabed mapping or surveying operations potentially linked to future uncrewed underwater vehicle deployments. AIS verification indicated that JIA GENG's movement in Pag-asa Island also formed a net-like pattern (FIGURE 3.16).

JIA GENG is a 78-meter oceanographic research vessel owned by Xiamen University and commissioned into China's State Oceanographic Research Fleet in 2017. It is equipped with high-performance acoustic sensors, weather radar systems, and high-speed data transmission capabilities, and can deploy uncrewed submarines to conduct seabed mapping and other advanced marine research¹⁰.

Other CRS vessels that transited through different areas of the Philippine EEZ and may have engaged in unauthorized MSR activities in 2025 are presented in the ANNEXES. These vessels are categorized into four




FIGURE 3.14. Historical track of JIA GENG (inset: Ayungin Shoal)



FIGURE 3.15. JIA GENG near Pag-asa Island



FIGURE 3.16. Track of JIA GENG in Pag-asa Island



main types: deep-sea and advanced technology, fisheries research and maritime surveillance, geological and seismic, and oceanographic and polar research. While classified by primary function, many of these vessels are capable of performing multiple roles.

III. ANALYSIS

The continued presence and unauthorized activities of CRS vessels, including seabed mapping and other deep-sea data collection using specialized instruments and equipment, within the Philippine EEZ, as well as the extended continental shelf, constitute clear violations of both national and international laws. Under UNCLOS, the Philippines has sovereign rights over natural resources in its EEZ (Article 56(1)(a)) and jurisdiction over marine scientific research (Article 56(1)(b)(ii)). Article 246(2) further requires that MSR in the EEZ or continental shelf be conducted only with the coastal State's consent, while Article 246(5) explicitly allows the coastal State to withhold consent, obligating foreign vessels to refrain from research if consent is denied. These legal provisions affirm the Philippines' sovereign rights over the exploration, exploitation, and management of maritime resources.

These MSR activities may not be purely scientific in nature but may serve dual-use or fulfill military purposes, consistent with China's civil-military fusion strategy. It is likely that the CRS vessels are collecting bathymetric, hydrographic, and geophysical data to map seabed and water column characteristics in critical chokepoints, such as the Luzon Strait and Bashi Channel. This information could then be used to identify optimal routing and stealth transit corridors for PLA-N submarines operating between the South China Sea and the Philippine Sea, particularly through deep-water passages exceeding 2,000-4,000 meters where submarines can remain submerged and undetected.


These operations occur in one of the most strategically vital maritime corridors in the Indo-Pacific, posing direct challenges to the sea-denial and anti-access capabilities of the U.S., Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines.

To address these threats, the Philippines should actively challenge the illegal MSR conducted by Chinese research vessels through sustained monitoring, radio challenges, and enforcement actions to assert and defend its maritime rights. Unauthorized activities should be publicly exposed to reinforce the country's legal and sovereign claims under UNCLOS and domestic laws.




Annex: Monitored CRS vessels

I. DEEP-SEA AND ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY



ANNEX 3.1. Track of Deep-Sea and Advanced Technology Research Vessels

DETAILS			
MMSI	413344550	Gross Tonnage	6,700 tons
Year Operational	2022	Length	99.8 meters
Max. Speed	15 knots	Width	32.0 meters
Owner/Operator	Chinese Government		
Designer/Builder	China State Shipbuilding Corporation/ Bohai Shipbuilding Heavy Industry Co. Ltd.		
Homeport	Nanshan Port, Hainan		
NOTABLE FEATURES			
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> One of the largest small waterplane area twin-hull (SWATH) research vessels Equipped with telescopic knuckle boom cranes on the fore and aft decks, two A-frames, and winches 			




ANNEX 3.2. BEI DIAO 996 (North Research 996) details¹¹

DETAILS			
MMSI	413212240	Gross Tonnage	4,500 tons
Year Operational	2018	Length	90.2 meters
Max. Speed	16 knots	Width	17.0 meters
Owner/Operator	China Deep Sea Centre		
Designer/Builder	708 th Research Institute, China State Shipbuilding Corporation		
Homeport	Qingdao, Shandong		
NOTABLE FEATURES			
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> Deep-sea support ship Mothership of Jiaolong, China's biggest manned deep-sea submersible Able to carry two additional remote-controlled submersibles Endurance up to 60 days 			



ANNEX 3.3. SHEN HAI YI HAO (Deep Sea No. 1) details¹²


Name	MMSI	Year Operational	Gross Tonnage	Owner/ Operator	Notable Features
SHI YAN 1	413542000	2009	698 tons	South China Sea Institute of Oceanology, Chinese Academy of Sciences	Small-waterplane-area twin hull (SWATH, noise-reduced platform; designed with advanced automation, dynamic positioning, and multidisciplinary research capabilities)
SHI YAN 3	413621760	1981	978 tons		Equipped with 13 laboratories including hydrology, chemistry, biology, physics, and geology
SHI YAN 6	413255690	2020	1,115 tons		Modern research platform, large deck, long-range missions



ANNEX 3.4. SHI YAN^{13, 14, 15}

DETAILS			
MMSI	413229620	Gross Tonnage	5,320 tons
Year Operational	2020	Length	87.25 meters
Max. Speed	14.2 knots	Width	19 meters
Owner/ Operator	Institute of Deep-sea Science and Engineering - Chinese Academy of Sciences		
Designer/ Builder	Mawei Shipbuilding Company Ltd.		
Homeport	Sanya, Hainan		
NOTABLE FEATURES			
1. Equipped with 13 laboratories (electromechanical, biology, geology, chemistry, geophysics, low-temperature sample chamber, acoustic control room, data processing center, among others)			


ANNEX 3.5. TAN SUO ER HAO (Explorer/ Discovery 2) details¹⁶



SOURCE : INSTITUTE OF DEEP-SEA SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING, CAS

DETAILS			
MMSI	413523770	Gross Tonnage	5,073 tons
Year Operational	1984	Length	94.45 meters
Max. Speed	13 knots	Width	17.9 meters
Owner/ Operator	Institute of Deep-sea Science and Engineering - Chinese Academy of Sciences		
Designer/ Builder	Amels Shipyard		
Homeport	Sanya, Hainan		
NOTABLE FEATURES			
1. Equipped with 11 laboratories			
2. Equipped with deep-sea operation watch system, sounding system, sediment collection device, seismic air and compressor system			
3. With auxiliary machinery (portal frame, crane, etc.)			
4. Can carry out deep-sea scientific investigation and tests			

ANNEX 3.6. TAN SUO YI HAO (Explorer/ Discovery 3) details¹⁷



SOURCE : INSTITUTE OF DEEP-SEA SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING, CAS




DETAILS			
MMSI	413624940	Gross Tonnage	6,800 tons
Year Operational	2025	Length	111.0 meters
Max. Speed	15 knots	Width	20.0 meters
Owner/ Operator	Taihu Lake Laboratory of Deep-Sea Technology and Science		
Designer/ Builder	Shanghai Shipbuilding Research and Design Institute/ CSSC Chengxi Shipbuilding		
Homeport			
NOTABLE FEATURES			
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Floating laboratory and testbed for intelligent systems 2. DP2 system, a stern A-frame, anti-roll fins, and a moonpool for deploying equipment into the water for testing 3. Onboard laboratories and data centers 			

ANNEX 3.7. WEI LAI (FUTURE) details¹⁸




DETAILS			
MMSI	413343790	Gross Tonnage	2,548 tons
Year Operational	2022	Length	89.0 meters
Max. Speed	18 knots	Width	14.0 meters
Owner/ Operator	Southern Ocean Science and Engineering Guangdong Laboratory, Sun Yat-sen University		
Designer/ Builder	Huangpu Wenchong Shipbuilding		
Homeport	Zhuhai Gaolan Port, Guangdong		
NOTABLE FEATURES			
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Intelligent unmanned systems science research mothership with autonomous navigation and remote-control capabilities 2. Supports unmanned systems and ocean scientific research tasks 3. Equipped with two A-frames enabling over-the-side operations. 4. Deployed unmanned craft can be controlled from the vessel, allowing for 3D section scan of the ocean 			

ANNEX 3.8. ZHU HAI YUN (ZHU HAI CLOUD) details^{19, 20}




II. FISHERIES RESEARCH AND MARITIME SURVEILLANCE



ANNEX 3.9. Tracks of Fisheries Research and Maritime Surveillance Vessels


DETAILS			
MMSI	412524240	Gross Tonnage	
Year Operational	2016	Length	89.0 meters
Max. Speed		Width	18.0 meters
Owner/Operator			
Designer/Builder	China Electronic Technology Group Corporation (CETC)		
Homeport	Sanya, Hainan		
NOTABLE FEATURES			
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Combined marine information equipment test ship 2. Equipped with large-scale heavy lift, A rack, and helicopter platform 3. Can conduct tests for electronic devices (i.e. drones, radars, etc.) 4. Supports underwater sound and meteorological exploration 			

ANNEX 3.10. DIAN KE 1 HAO details²¹



DETAILS			
MMSI	413582320	Gross Tonnage	4,600 tons
Year Operational	2024	Length	90.0 meters
Max. Speed	15 knots	Width	18.0 meters
Owner/Operator	State Oceanic Administration North Sea Branch		
Designer/Builder	Guangzhou Shipyard International, Guangzhou		
Homeport			
NOTABLE FEATURES			
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Drone-carrying icebreaker with Polar Class P6 capability 2. Equipped for oceanographic, sea ice, atmospheric, and environmental observations 			


ANNEX 3.11. JIDI details²²





DETAILS			
MMSI	413585690	Gross Tonnage	28,000 tons
Year Operational	2025	Length	200.0 meters
Max. Speed	15 knots	Width	32.0 meters
Owner/Operator			
Designer/Builder			
Homeport			
NOTABLE FEATURES			
1. Maritime space tracking and surveillance vessel 2. Can carry large radar and communications arrays			

ANNEX 3.12. LIAO WANG 1 details²³





DETAILS			
MMSI	412472850	Gross Tonnage	1,500 tons
Year Operational	2010	Length	67.0 meters
Max. Speed		Width	13.0 meters
Owner/Operator	South China Sea Fisheries Research Institute, Chinese Academy of Fishery Sciences		
Designer/Builder			
Homeport			
NOTABLE FEATURES			
1. Capable of fishery resource surveys, environmental data collection, and oceanographic sampling			

ANNEX 3.13. NAN FENG details²⁴




Name	MMSI
YUE XIA YU ZHI 20027	412536877
YUE XIA YU ZHI 20028	412536844
YUE XIA YU ZHI 20029	412471257

ANNEX 3.14. YUE XIA YU ZHI details²⁵




III. GEOLOGICAL AND SEISMIC RESEARCH



ANNEX 3.15. Tracks of Geological and Seismic Research Vessels

Name	MMSI	Year Operational	Gross Tonnage	Owner/ Operator	Notable Features
HAI YANG SHI YOU 720	413302640	2011	5,380 tons	China Oilfield Services (COSL) subsidiary of China National Offshore Oil Corporation	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Three-dimensional deepwater seismic research vessel 2. Equipped with Haijing marine seismic exploration system 3. Can generate detailed stratigraphic structure maps in waters up to 3,000 meters deep 4. Designed to tow twelve 8,000-metre cables for marine seismic data acquisition
HAI YANG SHI YOU 760	413305460	2015	5,941 tons		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Can generate and record sound waves to map subsurface geological structures beneath the sea floor 2. Can collect gravity, magnetic, and echo-sounding data




ANNEX 3.16. HAI YANG SHI YOU details^{26, 27}



DETAILS

MMSI	412461570	Gross Tonnage	2,619 tons
Year Operational	1978	Length	87.0 meters
Max. Speed		Width	14.0 meters
Owner/Operator	China Geological Survey		
Designer/Builder			
Homeport	Guangzhou, Guangdong		
NOTABLE FEATURES			
1. Geological research, seabed mapping, and scientific data collection missions			


ANNEX 3.17. HAI YANG DIZHI 12 HAO details²⁸



DETAILS

MMSI	412360000	G. Tonnage	4,335 tons
Year Operational	2010	Length	106.0 meters
Max. Speed		Width	17.4 meters
Owner/Operator	Guangzhou Ocean Bureau, China Geological Survey		
Designer/Builder	Wuchang Shipbuilding Industry Co., Ltd.		
Homeport	Guangzhou, Guangdong		
NOTABLE FEATURES			
1. Multi-purpose survey and research ship			
2. Believed to carry advanced systems for seabed exploration, including deep-sea remotely operated vehicles, multibeam bathymetry, shallow formation profiling, and high-resolution seismic acquisition equipment			
3. Supports broader studies in marine geology and mineral resource exploration			


ANNEX 3.18. HAI YANG DIZHI LIU HAO details²⁹




DETAILS

MMSI	413491880	Gross Tonnage	845 tons
Year Operational	2017	Length	76.0 meters
Max. Speed		Width	15.0 meters
Owner/Operator	China Geological Survey		
Designer/Builder			
Homeport	Guangzhou, Guangdong		
NOTABLE FEATURES			
1. Drilling-capable oceanographic survey vessel			
2. Extended deep-sea scientific missions			
3. Equipped with three-dimensional integrated exploration system			

ANNEX 3.19. HAI YANG DIZHI SHI HAO details³⁰




DETAILS			
MMSI	412461610	Gross Tonnage	2,608 tons
Year Operational	1980	Length	104.0 meters
Max. Speed		Width	14.0 meters
Owner/Operator	China Geological Survey		
Designer/Builder			
Homeport	Guangzhou, Guangdong		
NOTABLE FEATURES			
1. Geological research, seabed mapping, and scientific data collection missions			



ANNEX 3.20. HAI YANG DIZHI SI HAO details³¹


IV. OCEANOGRAPHIC AND POLAR RESEARCH



ANNEX 3.21. Tracks of Geological and Seismic Research Vessels

DETAILS			
MMSI	413332930	Gross Tonnage	5,602 tons
Year Operational	2019	Length	104.0 meters
Max. Speed		Width	17.0 meters
Owner/Operator	Ocean University of China		
Designer/Builder	Jiangnan Shipyard, Shanghai		
Homeport	Qingdao, China		
NOTABLE FEATURES			
1. Multi-disciplinary deep-sea scientific research vessels, with extensive deck space and laboratory facilities			
2. Comprehensive oceanographic surveys (atmosphere, water column, seabed and biological studies) and long-range expeditions			
3. Low underwater noise hull design			


ANNEX 3.22. DONG FANG HONG 3 details³²






DETAILS			
MMSI	413576710	Gross Tonnage	3,276 tons
Year Operational	2005	Length	98.0 meters
Max. Speed	24 knots	Width	15.0 meters
Owner/ Operator	Ministry of Natural Resources (MNR) South Sea Branch or State Oceanic Administration		
Designer/ Builder	Jiangnan Shipyard, Shanghai		
Homeport	Guangzhou, Guangdong		
NOTABLE FEATURES			
1. Bathymetric (sea-floor) surveying capability			

ANNEX 3.23. HAI CE 3301 (XIANG YANG HONG 33) details³³



DETAILS			
MMSI	412330910	Gross Tonnage	4,711 tons
Year Operational	2012	Length	99.8 meters
Max. Speed	15 knots	Width	17.8 meters
Owner/ Operator	Institute of Oceanology, Chinese Academy of Sciences		
Designer/ Builder	Marine Design & Research Institute of China/ Wuchang Shipbuilding Industry Co., Ltd.		
Homeport	Qingdao, Shandong		
NOTABLE FEATURES			
1. Equipped with advanced systems (water column, seafloor, and deep sea exploration systems, atmospheric detection system, and remote sensing validation system)			
2. Equipped with advanced shipboard laboratories			

ANNEX 3.24. KE XUE details³⁴




Name	MMSI	Year Operational	Gross Tonnage	Owner/ Operator	Notable Features
XIANG YANG HONG 01	413330890	2016	4,813 tons	First Institute of Oceanography, Ministry of Natural Resources	1. Modern multidisciplinary ocean research ship, functioning as a mobile marine laboratory and integrated scientific platform
XIANG YANG HONG 03	413701510	2016	5,200 tons	Third Institute of Oceanography, Ministry of Natural Resources	1. Advanced multipurpose ocean research vessel used for deep-sea surveying, microbial and environmental research
XIANG YANG HONG 05	413547290	1970	14,500 tons	Ministry of Natural Resources	1. Conducts ocean survey, geological exploration, and offshore marine environmental monitoring
XIANG YANG HONG 10	413452850	2014	4,502 tons	Second Institute of Oceanography, Ministry of Natural Resources	1. Has ice-breaking and dynamic positioning capabilities 2. Capable of field analyzing petroleum resources 3. Can deploy autonomous underwater vehicles
XIANG YANG HONG 17	413617730	2025	3,497 tons		
XIANG YANG HONG 31	413221490	2021	3,950 tons	South China Sea Rescue Bureau, Ministry of Transport	1. Purpose-built buoy transport and recovery vessel 2. Outfitted with a stern-mounted A-frame and an anti-way lifting device capable of handling 10-meter buoys and unmanned vehicles
XIANG YANG HONG 302	413491970		4,500 tons	State Oceanic Administration	1. Capable of deep-sea surveying, remote-operated vehicles and underwater drones

ANNEX 3.25. XIANG YANG HONG details³⁵

41




Name	MMSI	Year Operational	Gross Tonnage	Owner/ Operator	Notable Features
XUE LONG	412018330	1993	21,025 tons	Polar Research Institute of China	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Polar icebreaker 2. Houses multiple onboard labs, a helicopter deck, and ice-navigation systems for multidisciplinary research
XUE LONG 2	413381260	2019	14,300 tons		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Polar Class 3 2. Equipped for multidisciplinary polar research (oceanography, climate, glaciology) and logistics for polar stations



ANNEX 3.26. XUE LONG details^{42, 43}

DETAILS			
MMSI	413379250	Gross Tonnage	4,349 tons
Year Operational	2016	Length	97.0 meters
Max. Speed		Width	18.0 meters
Owner/ Operator	Ocean University of China		
Designer/ Builder	Zhejiang TianShi Shipbuilding Co., Ltd.		
Homeport	Luchao Port, Shanghai		
NOTABLE FEATURES			
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. China's first dedicated deep-sea research platform 2. Deep-sea submersibles, including the Rainbow Fish vehicle 			

ANNEX 3.27. ZHANG JIAN details⁴⁴





PART IV: Regional Developments

I. OVERVIEW

Developments in the region in 2025 can be characterized by China's use of hybrid warfare to further its expansionist claims in the South China Sea and the wider Indo-Pacific. China employs a combination of intimidating tactics, including large-scale exercises and the extensive deployment of paramilitary vessels across the globe, alongside diplomatic and informational operations. This integrated approach allows China to expand its sphere of influence, challenge the Indo-Pacific bloc, sway public opinion in its favor, and coerce target states into surrendering their rights and entitlements over areas it falsely claims as "disputed" or "unsettled." Despite China's actions, the Philippines remains steadfast in defending its interests in the West Philippine Sea. It continues to engage like-minded states to garner and maintain international support while enhancing its capabilities and strengthening its maritime defense posture.

II. CHINA'S HYBRID WARFARE

Conduct of military activities

A key aspect of China's hybrid warfare strategy is the continuous conduct of large-scale military operations in the region. In 2025, China carried out at least four major exercises: Strait Thunder 2025A, Golden Dragon 2025, Joint Sea 2025, and Justice Mission 2025.

Strait Thunder 2025A, held in April near Taiwanese waters, involved 135 PLA aircraft, 26 PLA-N ships, 14 CCG vessels, and the PLA-N aircraft carrier SHANDONG¹ (FIGURE 4.1). The exercise simulated a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan.

Golden Dragon 2025, conducted in May in partnership with Cambodia, highlighted peace, friendship, and cooperation (FIGURE 4.2). This exercise included 1,331 Cambodian personnel and 845 Chinese personnel, together with PLA-N vessels CHANGBAISHAN, PANZHIHUA, and GUANGYAN; two new-model Chinese Z-20 helicopters; 20 reconnaissance and combat drones; unmanned ground vehicles, and C5 command vehicles². This exercise demonstrated the deepening ties between the two countries,




FIGURE 4.1. Summary of Strait Thunder 2025A.

Source: Damien Symon's X Account

further strengthened by the recent inauguration of the China-funded Ream Base.

Joint Sea 2025, conducted in August near Vladivostok and the Sea of Japan, aimed to improve joint search-and-rescue operations, anti-submarine warfare tactics, and operate air defense systems³ (FIGURE 4.3). The drill involved joint maneuvers, submarine rescue, air defense

operations, anti-ship operations, anchorage defense, and replenishment at sea, among others. Chinese forces deployed PLA-N destroyers SHAOXING and URUMQI, while Russian forces contributed the anti-submarine vessel ADMIRAL TRIBUTS and corvette GROMKY⁴.

The year 2025 concluded with Justice Mission 2025 from 29 to 30 December, covering the northern, southwestern, southeastern, and eastern side of Taiwan⁵. Assets carried out blockade on key ports and areas, seizure of comprehensive superiority, joint sea-air combat readiness patrols, all-dimensional deterrence outside the First Island Chain, as well as live-fire drills. On Day 1, approximately 18 PLA-N vessels, 130 PLAAF aircraft, and 14 CCG vessels participated, with an additional 13 PLA-N vessels and 15 CCG vessels on Day 2 (FIGURE 4.4). Unlike previous PLA exercises such as Joint Sword, which focused on domestic separatist threats in Taiwan, Justice Mission 2025 targeted external interference and was conducted in direct response to the United States' announcement of an USD 11.1 billion arms sale to Taiwan⁶.

China and Japan Conflict

Heightened regional instability stemming from the possibility of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan prompted Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi to comment on the matter during a meeting with the Japanese Diet weeks after she assumed office⁷. She bared her interpretation of a "survival-threatening situation" that would warrant the deployment of the Self-Defense Forces. Such a situation would arise if China attempted to place Taiwan under its control through the use of military and naval force, or if it blocks U.S. warships from accessing Taiwan.

These remarks triggered a series of heated exchanges between the two countries. In a now-deleted post on X, Chinese Consul General in Japan Xue Jian commented that he "has no choice but to cut off that filthy head that has come charging in without a moment's



FIGURE 4.2. CHINA-Cambodia Golden Dragon 2025.

Source: Khmer Times



FIGURE 4.3. CHINA-Russia Joint Sea 2025 naval drill.

Source: CGTN




FIGURE 4.4. Summary of Justice Mission 2025.*

Source: Ian Ellis' X Account

hesitation."⁸ The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs also urged Japan to "stop playing with fire,"⁹ while concurrently summoning the Japanese Ambassador to China and calling for a boycott of Japanese products and



enterprises¹⁰. A series of letter exchanges also took place between China's Permanent Representative to the UN Ambassador Fu Cong, and Japan's Permanent Representative Ambassador Yamazaki Kazuyuki.^{11, 12, 13}

Aside from diplomatic and economic pressure, China also conducted more frequent patrols and exercises in areas surrounding Okinawa Prefecture, indicating a renewed claim over an area that it views as "unsettled territory." Last December, the PLA-N LIAONING Carrier Strike Group patrolled around Japan's southwest region, transiting between Okinawa and Miyako Island. The deployment included PLA-N cruiser NANCHANG, destroyers XINING and KAIFENG, and fast combat support ship HULUNHU¹⁴.

During this period, Chinese J-15 fighter jets reportedly locked radar onto Japan's F-15 jets on two occasions¹⁵. Concurrent with LIAONING's deployment, China and Russia conducted an 8-hour joint air patrol over Japan's air defense identification zone, flying over the Sea of Japan, the East China Sea, the western Pacific Ocean, as well as over Honshu, Kyushu and Sikoku islands, and both the Tsushima Strait and Miyako Strait¹⁶.

Deployment of para-military vessels

a. Chinese Research/Survey Vessels


The presence of Chinese state vessels in the region is complemented by the deployment of several CRS vessels transiting within various EEZs. In the Southeast Asian region, among those observed include TAN KAH KEE, ZHONG SHAN

DAXUE, BEI DIAO 996 (FIGURES 4.5 to 4.7) and NAN FENG.

TAN KAH KEE was reported to be operating 167 miles east of Okinotorishima Island, Japan in May¹⁷. ZHONG SHAN DA XUE entered and conducted survey activities within the respective EEZs of Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines in the same month. Previously, this vessel had been monitored carrying out semi-circular survey patterns in the northeastern part of the Philippines. BEI DIAO 996, a 99.6 meter-CRS vessel, was detected last June within Vietnam's EEZ and remained there for an extended period. Meanwhile, NAN FENG, a 66.6 meter-CRS, operated in the EEZs of Malaysia and Indonesia in August.

In East Asia, four CRS vessels—HAIYANG DIZHI JIU HAO, LV YUAN 288, LV YUAN 08, and SHUNYUN9988—previously carried out water column survey operations within the Provisional Measures Zone (PMZ) (FIGURE 4.8). Their presence may be linked to three Chinese maritime structures in the PMZ, one integrated management platform and two aquaculture cages, built without prior consultation with the South Korean government, which may constitute a violation of the provisional agreement.

The Indian Ocean also remains a regular area for CRS operations. In November, four vessels, LAN HAI 201, SHEN HAI YI HAO, SHI YAN 6, and LAN HAI 101 (FIGURE 4.9)¹⁸. Both LAN HAI 201 and LAN HAI 101 surveyed the same area in the early part of 2024.



FIGURES 4.5 to 4.7. Historical Tracks of CRS vessels TAN KAH KEE (Left), ZHONG SHAN DA XUE (Center), and BEI DIAO 996 (right).




FIGURE 4.8. Monitored tracks of four CRS vessels in China-South Korea provisional measures zone. Source: Ray Powell's




FIGURE 4.9. Monitored tracks of four CRS vessels in Indian Ocean region. Source: Ray Powell's X Page

b. Chinese Maritime Militia Vessels

A silent arm to establish permanent presence, China also deploys a substantial number of CMM vessels in different parts of the world. These deployments are attempts to curb domestic food insecurity while possibly enabling intelligence gathering and surveillance operations.

For instance, CMM vessel YUE HUI WAN YU 22888 was monitored in July together with CCG-5403, around 100 miles off the coast of Sarawak, Malaysia, near the Kasawari gas field¹⁹. South Korea also called out the illegal activities of Chinese fishing vessels within its EEZ, citing an encounter between two 300-ton Chinese fishing boats and the Korean Coast Guard²⁰. The crew members reportedly were armed with iron bars and had erected crude steel barriers along the vessels' hulls.

In other parts of the world, several accounts on X tagged the swarming of CMM vessels within and slightly outside the EEZ of South American

countries, such as Peru, Chile, and Argentina. Chilean fisherfolks even expressed their concerns that the overwhelming presence of Chinese vessels have hindered their ability to catch cuttlefish²¹.

c. Other Vessels of Interest

China deployed PLA-N hospital ship SILK ROAD ARK to embark on a 220-day mission, Mission Harmony 2025, beginning September. The vessel visited countries including Nauru, Fiji, Tonga, Mexico, Jamaica, Barbados, Brazil, Peru, Chile, and Papua New Guinea²². It has also embarked on a mission covering the Xisha Qundao and Nansha Qundao in the Paracels²³.

According to China's Defense Ministry, the mission "aims to strengthen friendly cooperation with relevant countries, offer more public safety resources to the international community, and further advance the concepts of a community with a shared future for mankind and a maritime community of shared future."

Mission Harmony allows China to expand its influence in two critical areas in the world, given that the target countries are located in the Second and Third Island Chains, as well as in the South American region. In the Pacific, China has intensified engagement with island nations, exploiting political, economic, and security channels. The concurrent deployment of fishing vessels within and near the EEZs of South American countries demonstrates this effort. Moreover, the use of a PLA-N shipped equipped with intelligence-gathering and surveillance capabilities further enhances China's strategic reach in critical maritime areas

Exploiting Diplomacy and Information Operations

a. On Diplomacy

Through diplomatic engagements, China leverages economic deals, people-to-people relations, and financial aids against relatively



FIGURES 4.10 to 4.12. Tri-country visit of President Xi in Vietnam, Malaysia, and Cambodia.

smaller states. In April, President Xi Jinping embarked on a tri-country visit to Vietnam, Malaysia, and Cambodia (FIGURES 4.10 to 4.12), resulting in various agreements on national defense, security, and territorial integrity, among others²⁴. It also hosted the 2025 China-Pacific Island Countries Foreign Ministers' Meeting in May, during which Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with senior representatives of Pacific Island Countries (PIC) such as Kiribati, Fiji, Solomon Island, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, Niue, Tonga, and Federated States of Micronesia (FIGURE 4.13). During the same period, China launched the International Organization for Mediation, attended by over 80 countries from Asia, Africa, Latin America, and Europe. The organization provides legal, voluntary, and nonbinding mechanism for mediating international disputes of a political and economic in nature.

China also capitalizes on major national milestones to strengthen ties with allies. In September, it celebrated the 80th Anniversary of Victory Day, attended by key world leaders like Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un (FIGURE 4.14)²⁵. This is alongside the participation of at least 25 leaders from Myanmar, Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Iran, Pakistan, Mongolia, Uzbek, Maldives, Nepal, and Zimbabwe, among others.

China further marked its National Day in October, during which President Xi emphasized the need to deepen cross-strait relations and reiterated firm opposition to separatist activities seeking Taiwan independence and external interference²⁶. In connection with the

celebration, a China Coast Guard vessel raised a Chinese flag in BdM²⁷.

b. On Information Operations

Alongside diplomatic efforts, China employs wide-scale information operations aimed at influencing, disrupting, corrupting, or usurping the decision-making capabilities of target states. In response to the Philippine government's transparency initiative in the West Philippine Sea, China has been constantly publishing and disseminating false narratives that discredit the Philippine government's efforts altogether.




FIGURE 4.13. 2025 China-Pacific Island Countries Foreign Ministers Meeting. Source: CGTN



FIGURE 4.14. Russian, Chinese, and North Korean Presidents during China's 2025 Victory Day Celebration. Source CBS News

An investigative report by PressOne.PH revealed 107 suspicious accounts on X that systematically publish content supporting Vice President Sara Duterte, attacked President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., and push content against Philippines' claims in the West Philippine Sea²⁸. In August, The Philippine Star flagged a coordinated network of bot accounts in X with nearly 1,000 posts framing Vietnam as the main threat in the South China Sea²⁹. The theme of attacks is focused on the destructive island-building activities of Vietnam and frequently targeted local media outlets, such as GMA News, Rappler, and Cebu Daily News.

Social media posts also circulated in various Chinese platforms claiming that Palawan Island is Zheng He Island and is part of China (FIGURE 4.15). Proponents of this narrative cite Palawan's close ties with mainland China as it became a supply station along the Maritime Silk Road connecting East Asia to Southeast Asia³⁰.

Chinese information operators tend to cling to the clout and popularity of the Duterte family to discredit the foreign policy of the current administration, which they paint as overly dependent on the United States. This support is evident in statements and articles issued by Chinese government entities and state-sanctioned media outlets maligning the arrest of former President Rodrigo Duterte³¹ and congratulating him on his recent electoral victory as Davao City Mayor³². Furthermore, Chinese propagandists have framed the results of the national elections as mirroring the sentiment of Filipinos against the foreign policy of the current administration, citing the failure of administration-aligned candidates to secure a majority in the 20th Congress.

Academic institutions are also significant avenues to carry out information operations. In September, the Philippine-Chinese Studies Center at the Diliman College was launched (FIGURE 4.16), with objectives that include,

among others, to reshaping the negative perception of Filipinos toward China. This event was followed by a large gathering of overseas Chinese citizens at the Century Park Hotel in Manila³³. In December, the China-ASEAN Education Exchange Week was commemorated to foster more people-to-people exchanges between and among Chinese and Southeast Asian students³⁴. Xiamen University also organized a Workshop on Philippine Studies, participated by known pro-China propagandists³⁵.



FIGURE 4.15. Social media post claiming that Palawan is part of China.

Source: National Historical Commission of the Philippines



FIGURE 4.16. Ribbon cutting ceremony of the Philippine-Chinese Studies Center in Diliman College with Former NSA Clarita Carlos, Director Rommel Balaoi, Diliman College President Nikki Coseteng, Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce and Industry Inc President Victor Lim, and Association for Philippines-China Understanding Chairman Raul Lambino. Source: Diliman College



III. PHILIPPINE EFFORTS

The Philippine government maintains cordial relations with allies and like-minded states, through its participation in various dialogues and high-impact meetings, such as the 2025 Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore³⁶, the Dialogue on ASEAN Maritime Security (DAMS) in Manila, and the Manila Dialogue on the South China Sea³⁷.

President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. also attended the 47th Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Summit in Malaysia³⁸ and the 2025 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit in South Korea³⁹ (FIGURES 4.17 and 4.18). These are fora allowed the president to articulate the Philippines' stance on the South China Sea issue before an international audience, while calling the attention to the illegal, coercive, aggressive, and deceptive actions of China within Philippine waters. Participation in these meetings also serves as a good precursor to gain momentum ahead of the Philippines' ASEAN chairmanship in 2026.

Additionally, the Philippines continues to build and improve its current defense posture through the acquisition of maritime domain awareness assets, and the conduct of various bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral exercises to enhance interoperability and operational precision. In 2025, the Armed Forces of the Philippines acquired two corvettes⁴⁰ and six (6) offshore patrol vessels⁴¹ from South Korea's HD Hyundai Heavy Industries. The country also carried out major exercises such as the annual BALIKATAN Exercises with the U.S., the KAMANDAG 9 or the Kaagapay ng mga Mandirigma ng Dagat⁴², and the ALON 2025 with Australia⁴³. These are alongside the establishment of a forward operating base in Mahatao, Batan Island, Batanes⁴⁴.

For the PCG, it participated in a trilateral coast guard exercise off the vicinity waters of Kagoshima, Japan, together with Japan Coast Guard and the USCG⁴⁵. BRP GABRIELA SILANG conducted a tri-country mission in April, visiting Thailand, Malaysia, and Vietnam⁴⁶ (FIGURES 4.19 and 4.20). All these efforts are geared towards

effectively and efficiently asserting Philippine maritime rights and entitlements, rights that are not a figment of imagination, but grounded in domestic and international law.



FIGURES 4.17 and 4.18. President Marcos during the 2025 ASEAN in Malaysia (top) and 2025 APEC Summit in South Korea (bottom). Source: PCO



FIGURES 4.19 and 4.20. Photos during the PCG's tri-country port visits in Thailand, Malaysia, and Vietnam.

III. ANALYSIS

In the first half of the year, China maintained its goal of unilaterally threatening Taiwan, focusing on quelling separatist movements and undermining calls for formal independence. These objectives were carried out through an array of military exercises, ranging from piecemeal combat-readiness and routine patrols to large-scale displays of strength. The focus shifted dramatically following the remarks of Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi regarding a potential “Taiwan contingency,” which China interpreted as external interference in what it views as an “inevitable” reunification.

China’s messaging targeted PM Takaichi personally, framing her as the source of regional instability, despite her reiteration of longstanding policy as reflected in Japan’s National Security Policy. Gendered attacks were also evident, with state and social media portraying her negatively, describing her as a “witch” and emphasizing alleged personal shortcomings and work ethics to question her credibility and interpersonal skills. This sustained tension against Japan has influenced China’s broader regional diplomacy, prompting attempts to woo its allies while also creating counterbalancing pressures against Japan, including engagement with South Korea by highlighting atrocities committed by Imperial Japan during the Second World War.

China’s deployment of paramilitary and research vessels has continued to capitalize on the gray areas of UNCLOS. CRS vessels are entitled to exercise their rights to continuous, expeditious, and unobstructed transit within the EEZ of other states. In practice, however, some CRS vessels transit at extremely low speeds, raising questions about the exercise of these rights. CMM vessels, meanwhile, engage in unsanctioned fishing activities inside other countries’ EEZs, in clear violation of UNCLOS, which reserves resource exploitation rights to the coastal state. Even when stationed just outside maritime zones, these vessels swarm adjacent areas, effectively appropriating benefits meant for the coastal state.

Diplomacy and information operations remain core instruments of China’s influence. In 2025, it orchestrated targeted campaigns and attacks to undermine the legitimacy of the government’s West Philippine Sea initiatives, sow animosity with other Southeast Asian states such as Vietnam, and preserve a favorable international image that encourages a softer stance on regional security issues. Pro-China propagandists and cohorts also downplay the Philippine position by tying it to personality politics rather than a unifying and intergenerational issue. As a result, this narrative diminishes public support for the Philippines’ transparency initiatives and hinders broader consensus on maritime governance, particularly among constituencies aligned with opposition figures.



PART IV: West Philippine Sea Transparency Group

I. OVERVIEW

In 2025, the West Philippine Sea Transparency Group (WPSTG) continued to serve as an essential communicative arm of the PCG and the National Task Force for the West Philippine Sea (NTF-WPS), using transparency as a tool for national security, public awareness, and diplomatic engagement. During this period, WPSTG expanded its outreach through broadcast and print interviews, social media updates, participation in regional conferences and symposiums, most notably the Dialogue on ASEAN Maritime Security and the second iteration of the Manila Dialogue, and university-based activities aimed at civic education. It also launched a regional radio campaign to reach rural audiences and took part in policy discussions, including a House Tri-Committee hearing on disinformation.


WPSTG also ensures that its line of effort is felt at the grassroots level by consistently engaging with relevant sectors in the community. The KBBM program was launched to support the livelihood of local fisherfolk in coastal provinces. Social science teachers were engaged to strengthen their foundational knowledge of the West Philippine Sea dispute based on relevant international and domestic laws. Conversely, film screenings of the documentary “Food Delivery: Fresh from the West Philippine Sea” were held, with participation from government agencies, uniformed personnel, and representatives of various civil society organizations.

These efforts support the broader objective of countering false narratives, promoting legal and maritime domain awareness, and engaging a diverse public in matters concerning the West Philippine Sea, contributing to a more informed and resilient national discourse.

By engaging students directly, COMMODORE TARRIELA fosters early awareness and empowers young Filipinos to become informed voices in defending the West Philippine Sea.

SUMMARY OF ENGAGEMENTS FOR 2025	
Broadcast and Print Interviews	139
Campus Caravans and Symposiums	44
Policy Engagements/Forums	42
Legislative Hearings	3
Participation in Government Events	30
Briefings and Meetings with Foreign Dignitaries	35
Documentary Film Screening Panel Engagement	21
WPS Seminar-Workshop on Social Studies Teachers	4

TABLE 5.1. West Philippine Sea Transparency Group's Engagements for 2025



II. ADVOCACIES AND LITERACY CAMPAIGNS

“Mga Kwento ni Teacher Jun” Comic Book Launch

The formal launch of the educational comic series Mga Kwento ni Teacher Jun on 24 January at the National Library of the Philippines (FIGURES 5.1 to 5.4) represented a milestone in the government’s civic education and information campaign. Framed around the pillars of maritime sovereignty, historical memory, and national resilience, the comic translates complex geopolitical issues into a culturally resonant narrative format.

The event drew key stakeholders from government agencies, the education sector, and the maritime law community to reaffirm the importance of storytelling as a tool in combating historical revisionism and disinformation. The comic was written in a bilingual format and distributed nationwide to enhance accessibility, particularly for public school students and teachers.

In September, the WPSTG, in partnership with the Department of Justice, also carried out a reading activity for young learners aimed at introducing basic concepts of maritime security, environmental protection, and territorial integrity. The goal was to develop early understanding of civic duty and shared responsibility even at a young age.



FIGURES 5.1 and 5.2
COMMO TARRIELA poses with the National Security Adviser, Hon. Sec. Eduardo Año during the formal launch of the “Mga Kwento ni Teacher Jun” educational comic series.



FIGURES 5.3 and 5.4
COMMO TARRIELA poses with the staff, personnel, and officers of the PCG West Philippine Transparency Group.



Short educational videos

To complement this print-based initiative, the WPSTG produced a series of short educational videos as part of its broader multimedia strategy. These videos—"Ano at Saan ang West Philippine Sea," "Alam mo ba ang Kahalagahan ng West Philippine Sea sa Pilipinas at sa Bawat Pilipino," and "Pagkakaiba ng South China Sea sa West Philippine Sea" (FIGURE 5.5)—were designed as introductory explainer materials for the general public, particularly students and non-specialist audiences.

Youth engagement

On 19 February, the PCG, the National Youth Commission (NYC), and the Philippine Information Agency (PIA) signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) institutionalizing youth engagement in maritime advocacy initiatives (FIGURE 5.6). This agreement formalized collaboration on digital campaigns, academic lectures, and regional symposiums focused on issues surrounding the West Philippine Sea, with the objective of integrating youth participation into policy awareness and grassroots outreach.

To further expand youth-oriented advocacies, the WPSTG launched campus caravans and university symposiums in partnership with academic institutions, NYC, and the PIA. These events were held in regions such as Ilocos, CALABARZON, Central Luzon, Western Visayas, Cagayan, Northern Mindanao, and Bicol. Discussions focused on maritime law, sovereignty, and disinformation (FIGURES 5.7 to 5.12).




FIGURE 5.5
Screencap of the educational video posted through Facebook featuring COMMO TARRIELA



FIGURE 5.6
The Commandant, PCG, ADM RONNIE GIL L GAVAN, PIA DG Katherine Chloe S. De Castro, and NYC Chairperson and CEO Joesph Francisco Ortega during a MOU signing in February 2025.



FIGURES 5.7 to 5.12
COMMO TARRIELA on the go during various speaking engagements around the country



FIGURES 5.13 to 5.15

ADM GAVAN delivers his remarks during the launching of the KBBM program at Bataraza Palawan in June 2025

KBBM Program

In June, the Philippine government launched the socioeconomic initiative, the KBBM program, at Buliluyan Port, Bataraza, Palawan (FIGURES 5.13 to 5.15). The program provides logistical and economic support to fisherfolk operating in the West Philippine Sea. In doing so, it supports national food security while reinforcing a sustained maritime presence.

The WPSTG plays a key role in communicating the program’s significance, linking livelihood support with the assertion of sovereignty and environmental stewardship within the broader framework of government transparency and maritime governance.

“Food Delivery: Fresh from the West Philippine Sea” film showing



FIGURES 5.16 to 5.19

Food Delivery screenings and talkbacks



The WPSTG also leveraged film as an effective medium to amplify the Philippine government's transparency initiative. "Food Delivery: Fresh from the West Philippine Sea" (Food Delivery), a documentary directed by Baby Ruth Villarama, depicts the experiences of Filipino fishermen and uniformed personnel in asserting and safeguarding the country's maritime rights and entitlements.

In collaboration with various cinema companies, the WPSTG and the Food Delivery production team organized multiple block screenings nationwide (FIGURES 5.16 to 5.19). These screenings engaged government agencies, uniformed services, and civil society organizations. Additional screenings were also initiated by various organizations, often inviting COMMODORE JAY TARRIELA to participate in post-screening discussions.



FIGURES 5.20 to 5.22

ADM GAVAN delivers his remarks during the 2025 Dialogue on ASEAN Maritime Security (DAMS); (top, left); COMMO TARRIELA engages in the discussion (bottom, right)

Dialogue on ASEAN Maritime Security (DAMS 2025)

The WPSTG participated in the 2025 Dialogue on ASEAN Maritime Security (DAMS), a Track 1.5 forum held from 21 to 23 May (FIGURES 5.20 to 5.22). The forum convened regional experts to explore cooperative approaches to maritime security challenges and the preservation of the rule of law. During the dialogue, the PCG highlighted the role of transparency and information-sharing mechanisms in fostering regional confidence-building measures.

2025 Manila Dialogue on the South China Sea

The second Manila Dialogue on the South China Sea was convened from 5 to 7 November, bringing together policymakers, academics, and foreign policy experts from across the Indo-Pacific (FIGURES 5.23 to 5.26). Discussions emphasized the importance of a rules-based international order and generated policy-oriented recommendations. Delegates also acknowledged unconventional and emerging maritime security concerns, including threats to undersea infrastructure.

Seminar Workshop on WPS for Social Studies Teachers

The WPSTG, in partnership with the Department of Education (DepEd), convened seminar workshops for social studies teachers in the National Capital Region, Zamboanga Peninsula, Northern Mindanao, and SOCCSKSARGEN. The workshops covered the legal basis of the Philippines' claims in the West Philippine Sea, including UNCLOS and the 2016 Arbitral Award, as well as the government's transparency initiative and China's information operations through its United Front Works. The activities aimed to strengthen civic awareness and national consciousness among educators and youth influencers in each region.



FIGURES 5.23 to 5.26
2025 Manila Dialogue on the South China Sea

III. ANALYSIS AND WAY FORWARD

In 2025, the WPSTG increasingly integrated conventional information dissemination methods with more adaptive, people-centered approaches to communicate government positions on West Philippine Sea issues. This shift reflects an acknowledgment of the evolving information environment and the need to refine engagement strategies to maintain both relevance and reach.

Despite notable gains, challenges persist. Public beliefs, perceptions, and willingness to engage with information regarding West Philippine Sea issues remain influenced by political affiliation, geographic location, and exposure to competing narratives. Communities in more remote areas often prioritize immediate socioeconomic concerns, such as corruption or poverty, resulting in lower engagement with maritime issues. In some cases, these areas are also more susceptible to disinformation, particularly where local political dynamics align with pro-China messaging.

Moving forward, the WPSTG will prioritize the expansion of campus caravans, the localization of educational materials for use by local government units, and the integration of data visualization and analytics into its digital platforms. It also plans to develop additional short-form digital content to enhance youth engagement. Continued collaboration with civil society, academic institutions, and international partners will remain essential to sustaining transparency, strengthening public awareness, and reinforcing effective maritime governance.



Annex: Summary of Incidents

Date/ Location	Vessels Involved	Details
DATE: 20 to 23 January 2025	PHILIPPINES: BRP SULUAN	INCIDENTS: a. Radio Challenges b. Dangerous Maneuver
LOCATION: Bajo de Masinloc	CHINA: CCG-3103	DETAILS: BRP SULUAN was subjected to a dangerous maneuver by CCG-3103 at 40.0 yards port beam to dead ahead on 21 January, while approximately 63.5 nautical miles southeast of BdM. During its MARPAT from 20 to 23 January, BRP SULUAN had one round of radio challenge exchanges with CCG-3304 and two with CCG-3103.
DATE: 21 to 29 January 2025	PHILIPPINES: BRP CABRA	INCIDENTS: a. Radio Challenges b. Sounding of horns/sirens
LOCATION: Bajo de Masinloc	CHINA: CCG-3103 CCG-3304	DETAILS: BRP CABRA took over the MARPAT mission from 21 to 29 January and engaged in 11 rounds of radio challenge exchanges with CCG-3103, and two rounds with CCG-3304, while operating around 28.19 nautical miles northeast of BdM on 25 January. During this encounter, CCG-3103 utilized a siren or a suspected LRAD against the PCG vessel. Despite CCG behavior, the PCG vessel was to approach as close as 28.19 nautical miles northeast of BdM.
DATE: 22 January 2025	PHILIPPINES: FFB	INCIDENTS: a. Radio Challenges b. Sounding of horns/sirens c. Driving-away
LOCATION: Bajo de Masinloc	CHINA: CCG-3502	DETAILS: On 22 January, an FFB was fishing roughly 22.0 nautical miles southeast of BdM when CCG-3502 approached within 50.9 meters and blew its horn. The FFB crew switched its radio to Channel 16 and was radio challenged by the CCG vessel, which ordered them to leave the area. The FFB crew responded by asserting that



they were only conducting small-scale fishing but received no response.

CCG-3502 then issued a second radio challenge. This time, the FFB crew responded that they would depart from the area upon the arrival of their service boats. CCG-3502 shadowed the FFB until it had reached 10.0 nautical miles from its original location.

DATE: 24 January 2025	PHILIPPINES: BRP DATU BANKAW BRP DATU PAGBUAYA BFAR RHIB	INCIDENTS: a. Driving-away b. Use of Riot gears c. Dangerous Maneuvers (aerial deployment)
LOCATION: Sand Cay 2, Pag-asa Island	CHINA: CCG RHIBs CCG-4106 CCG-4202 CMMV 00222 PLA-N Medium-lift Helicopter Tail No. 42	DETAILS: BFAR, in joint operations with the PCG, deployed BRP DATU PAGBUAYA and BRP DATU BANKAW for MARPAT duties in Pag-asa Island. Dangerous maneuvers and RHIB-to-RHIB action occurred, during which a Chinese medium-lift helicopter flew at low altitude to disrupt operations. Some CCG personnel wielded steel batons and hooks, using them in an intimidating manner toward Filipino personnel.
DATE: 01 February 2025	PHILIPPINES: FFB	INCIDENTS: a. Shadowing b. Sounding of horns/sirens c. Driving-away
LOCATION: Bajo de Masinloc	CHINA: CCG-5901	DETAILS: On 01 February, while moored roughly 28.0 nautical miles southeast of BdM, CCG-5901 approached 10 meters of an FFB's astern side and sounded its horn seven times. This prompted the FFB to leave the area. CCG-5901 shadowed the FFB until it reached 9.0 nautical miles away from its previous location.
DATE: 11 February 2025	PHILIPPINES: FFB	INCIDENTS: a. Shadowing b. Driving-away
LOCATION: Bajo de Masinloc	CHINA: CCG-3304	DETAILS: On 11 February, around 48.0 nautical miles northwest of BdM, an FFB was reportedly driven away by CCG-3304. This prompted the Filipino fisherfolk to discard their fishing equipment to increase their speed. CCG-3304 shadowed the FFB until reaching roughly 14.0 nautical miles from their previous location.





Date:

18 February 2025

LOCATION:

Bajo de Masinloc

PHILIPPINES:

BFAR Cessna 208B
Grand Caravan
aircraft RP-1077

CHINA:

PLA-N Air Force Harbin
Z-9 helicopter 68

INCIDENTS:

a. Close approach to aircraft

DETAILS:

BFAR deployed its Cessna 208B Grand Caravan aircraft with tail no. RP-1077 on 18 February to conduct a Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) flight in the airspace over BdM.

During the flight, PLA-N Air Force Harbin Z-9 helicopter with tail no. 68 harassed the BFAR aircraft by conducting at least two dangerous maneuvers.

PLA-N Air Force Harbin Z-9 helicopter approached as close as around three (3) meters from the BFAR aircraft's portside wing.

DATE:

19 and 20 February 2025

LOCATION:

Bajo de Masinloc

PHILIPPINES:

FFB

CHINA:

CCG-3105
CCG-3305
Two (2) unidentified
CMM vessels

INCIDENTS:

a. Shadowing

b. Driving-away

DETAILS:

On 19 February, while an FFB was fishing at a payao around 30.0 nautical miles southeast of BdM, CCG-3105 and 3305 approached within 50 meters and 200 meters, respectively.

A CCG personnel member aboard CCG-3105 reportedly took photos and videos of the FFB and issued challenges using a megaphone. Despite the encounter, the FFB remained at its payao.

The following day, the FFB relocated to another payao around 3.0 nautical miles northeast of its previous location, where it was shadowed by two (2) unidentified CMM vessels.

DATE:

21 February to
05 March 2025

LOCATION:

Bajo de Masinloc

PHILIPPINES:

BRP TERESA
MAGNANUA

CHINA:

CCG-3105
CCG-3301
PLA-N 574

INCIDENTS:

a. Radio Challenges

b. Dangerous Maneuvers

DETAILS:

BRP TERESA MAGNANUA conducted a 13-day MARPAT from 21 February to 05 March, during which it had one (1) radio challenge exchange with PLA-N 574, two (2) with CCG-3105, and six (6) with CCG-3301. Its closest approach to BdM was approximately 27.78 nautical miles southeast of the shoal on 28 February.

BRP TERESA MAGNANUA was also subjected to dangerous maneuvers by CCG-3301 on 26 February and 01 March, respectively.

DATE:

03 and 04 March 2025

LOCATION:

Bajo de Masinloc

PHILIPPINES:

BRP MALAPASCUA

CHINA:

CCG-3105

INCIDENTS:

a. Radio Challenges

b. Driving-away



LOCATION:
Abad Santos Shoal

CCG-3104
CCG-5201
CCG-21549
CCG-21558
CCG-21559

c. Dangerous Maneuvers

DETAILS:

The CCG began following the PCG vessel around 31 nautical miles north-northwest of Rizal, Palawan or 16.6 nautical miles east-southeast of Abad Santos (Bombay) Shoal. Active blockings were recorded as close as 100 yards, occurring around 17.6 nautical miles northeast of Ayungin Shoal. Attempts to approach the shoal from Hubo Reef were met with route obstructions and radio challenges.

DATE:
05 to 10
March 2025

PHILIPPINES:
BRP CABRA

INCIDENTS:

- a. Radio Challenges
- b. Sounding of horns/sirens
- c. Dangerous Maneuvers

DETAILS:

BRP CABRA conducted a MARPAT from 05 to 10 March, during which it had one radio challenge exchange with CCG-3105, and two with CCG-4201. The PCG vessel's closest approach to the shoal was around 25.08 nautical miles southeast on 04 March.

On 08 March, while located approximately 36.02 nautical miles southeast of BdM, CCG-3105 approached BRP CABRA 0.07 nautical miles port beam and sounded its horn twice.

LOCATION:
Bajo de Masinloc

CHINA:
CCG-3105
CCG-4201

DATE:
09 March 2025

PHILIPPINES:
FFB

LOCATION:
Bajo de Masinloc

CHINA:
Unidentified CCG vessel

INCIDENTS:

- a. Shadowing
- b. Sounding of horns/sirens
- c. Driving-away

DETAILS:

On 09 March, 20.0 nautical miles southeast of BdM, an unidentified CCG vessel followed an FFB at 400.0 meters starboard while sounding its horn. This prompted the FFB to turn on its lights, fearing a dangerous maneuver.

CCG vessel ceased shadowing the FFB upon reaching 44.0 nautical miles southwest of BdM.

DATE:
09 March 2025

PHILIPPINES:
FFB

LOCATION:
Bajo de Masinloc

CHINA:
QIONG SANSHA YU 00314
Unidentified CCG vessel
Unidentified CMM vessel

INCIDENTS:

- a. Shadowing
- b. Driving-away
- c. Blocking

DETAILS:

On 09 March, an FFB reported that it reached 100.0 meters from the southern part of BdM, where it was shadowed by CMM vessel QIONG SANSHA YU 00314 and another unidentified





CMM vessel, as well as an unidentified CCG vessel at 500.0 meters.

QIONG SANSHA YU 00314 blocked the FFB from proceeding westward, pressuring the boat to alter its course. Chinese vessels stopped shadowing the FFB after it reached 40.0 nautical miles south of BdM.

DATE:

11 to 14
March 2025

PHILIPPINES:

BRP DATU BANKAW
BRP DATU PAGBUAYA

INCIDENTS:

- a. Radio Challenges
- b. Dangerous Maneuvers

LOCATION:

Bajo de Masinloc

CHINA:

CCG-3105
CCG-4201

DETAILS:

BFAR vessels BRP DATU BANKAW and BRP DATU PAGBUAYA conducted MARPATs in the West Philippine Sea from 11 to 14 March. Both vessels had two (2) radio challenge exchanges with CCG-4201, respectively. BRP DATU BANKAW was also subjected to at least two (2) dangerous maneuvers by CCG-3105.

BRP DATU BANKAW and BRP DATU PAGBUAYA were able to reach as close as 23.97NM and 28.86NM southwest of BdM, respectively, on 12 March.

DATE:

12 March 2025

PHILIPPINES:

FFB

INCIDENTS:

- a. Shadowing
- b. Sounding of horns/sirens
- c. Dangerous Maneuvers

LOCATION:

Bajo de Masinloc

CHINA:

CCG-5303

DETAILS:

While heading east 22.0 nautical miles southwest of BdM on 12 March, an FFB was approached and reportedly subjected to dangerous maneuvers by CCG-5303, which forced the FFB to change its course.

CCG-5303 continued to follow at 50.0 meters portside while sounding its siren. It terminated its action when the FFB was 24.0 nautical miles south of BdM.

DATE:

16 to 25
March 2025

PHILIPPINES:

BRP CABRA

INCIDENTS:

- a. Radio Challenges
- b. Sounding of horns/sirens
- c. Dangerous Maneuvers

LOCATION:

Bajo de Masinloc

CHINA:

CCG-3105
CCG-5303

DETAILS:

BRP CABRA conducted a 10-day MARPAT from 16 to 25 March, during which it had two (2) radio challenge exchanges with CCG vessels 3105 and 5303, respectively. Its closest approach is around 24.8NM southeast of BdM on 20 March.

CCG-3105 also subjected the PCG vessel to two dangerous maneuvers on 23 March by

approaching BRP CABRA as close as 50.0 to 70.0 yards while sounding its horn.

DATE: 24 March 2025	PHILIPPINES: FFB	INCIDENTS: a. Driving-away b. Dangerous Maneuvers
LOCATION: Bajo de Masinloc	CHINA: CCG-5203 CCG-5303 Two CCG RHIBs	DETAILS: On 24 March, CCG vessels 5203 and 5303 each launched a rigid-hulled inflatable boat (RHIB) which reportedly pursued an FFB closing in to within 10.0 meters from its port outrigger. CCG personnel onboard the RHIBs used hand gestures directing the FFB to depart the area.
DATE: 01 to 08 April 2025	PHILIPPINES: BRP CABRA	INCIDENTS: a. Shadowing b. Radio Challenges c. Sounding of horns/sirens d. Dangerous Maneuvers
LOCATION: Bajo de Masinloc	CHINA: CCG-3302 CCG-3502 CCG-21612 PLA-N 553 PLA-N 627 CMM QIONG SAN SHA YU 00314	DETAILS: BRP CABRA conducted a MARPAT mission from 01 to 08 April during which it monitored and shadowed CMM vessel QIONG SAN SHA YU 00314 , CCG vessels 3302, 3502, and 21612 , as well as PLA-N ships 553 and 627 . The PCG vessel also engaged in seven radio challenge exchanges with CCG-3302 , and one each with CCG vessels 3502 and 21612 . BRP CABRA was subjected to the sounding of horns by CCG-3502 , and multiple dangerous maneuvers from the CCG vessels. CCG-3302 made the closest approach to the PCG vessel near collision on 07 April, while around 25.45 nautical miles east-southeast of BdM. BRP CABRA's closest approach to the shoal was 24.37 nautical miles east on 02 April.
DATE: 16 April 2025	PHILIPPINES: FFB	INCIDENTS: a. Shadowing
LOCATION: Bajo de Masinloc	CHINA: CCG-3502	DETAILS: On 06 April, while around 22.0 nautical miles southeast of BdM, CCG-3502 reportedly shadowed an FFB approximately 200.0 meters port side.
DATE: 08 to 12 April 2025	PHILIPPINES: BRP MALABRIGO	INCIDENTS: a. Shadowing
LOCATION: Bajo de Masinloc	CHINA: CCG-3302 PLA-N 161	DETAILS: From 08 to 12 April, BRP MALABRIGO conducted a MARPAT mission, during which it monitored and shadowed CCG-3302 , as well as PLA-N ships 161 and 568 . Its closest approach to BdM



PLA-N 568

was 38.01 nautical miles northeast on 09 April. No untoward incidents occurred.

DATE:

12 to 19
April 2025

PHILIPPINES:

BRP CABRA

INCIDENTS:

- a. Shadowing
- b. Radio Challenges
- c. Dangerous Maneuvers

LOCATION:

Bajo de Masinloc

CHINA:

CCG-3302
CCG-5303
CCG-21612
PLA-N 552

DETAILS:

From 12 to 19 April, **BRP CABRA** conducted a MARPAT mission, during which it monitored and shadowed **CCG vessels 3302, 5303, and 21612**, as well as **PLA-N ship 552**. The PCG vessel had four radio challenge exchanges and with **CCG-21612** and was subjected by the same CCG vessel to two dangerous maneuvers on 13 and 14 April, respectively.

DATE:

18 to 27
April 2025

PHILIPPINES:

BRP SULUAN

INCIDENTS:

- a. Shadowing
- b. Radio Challenges

LOCATION:

Bajo de Masinloc

CHINA:

CCG-3302
CCG-3502
CCG-5303
CCG-21612
PLA-N 552
PLA-N 620
CMM QIONG SAN SHA
YU 00206

DETAILS:

From 18 to 27 April, **BRP SULUAN** conducted a MARPAT mission, during which it observed and followed **CCG vessels 3302, 3502, 5303, and 21612, PLA-N ships 552, 554, and 620**, as well as CMM vessel **QIONG SAN SHA YU 00206**, and had a radio exchange with **CCG-21612**. **BRP SULUAN** was able to enter BdM's contiguous zone on 24 April, approaching as close as 23.3 nautical miles east-southeast of the shoal.

DATE:

21 April 2025

CHINA:

CCG Personnel

INCIDENTS:

- a. Flag raising operations

LOCATION:

Sand Cay 2,
Pag-asa Island

DETAILS:

The Chinese Government through China state-sponsored media Global Times, released an image depicting four (4) coast guard personnel standing with China's national flag on what they claimed to be "Tiexian Jiao" or Sand Cay-2. The article characterized the act as a "assertion of sovereignty" and highlighted China Coast Guard's maritime control over the Reef around mid-April.

DATE:

26 April 2025

PHILIPPINES:

FFB

INCIDENTS:

- a. Shadowing

LOCATION:

Bajo de Masinloc

CHINA:

CCG-5303
PLA-N 620

DETAILS:

On 26 April, while at 24.0 nautical miles northeast of BdM, **PLA-N 620** and **CCG-5303** reportedly approached and shadowed an FFB



at 1.0 nautical mile, prompting the boat to leave the area.

DATE:
26 April to 07 May 2024

PHILIPPINES:
BRP CABRA

LOCATION:
Bajo de Masinloc

CHINA:
CCG-3302
CCG-3306
CCG-5303
CCG-5403
CCG-21612
CCG-21558
PLA-N 552
PLA-N 554
PLA-N 573
PLA-N 885

INCIDENTS:

- a. Shadowing
- b. Radio Challenges

DETAILS:

From 26 April to 07 May, **BRP CABRA** conducted a MARPAT mission during which it monitored and shadowed **CCG vessels 3302, 3306, 5303, 5403, 21612, and 21558, PLA-N ships 554, 885, 552, and 573** as well as **QIONG SANSHA YU 00206**.

BRP CABRA also had radio exchanges with **CCG-5303** and **21612**, and the CMM vessel. Its closest approach to the shoal is approximately 24.24 nautical miles southeast of the shoal on 01 May.

DATE:
04 May 2025

PHILIPPINES:
FFB

LOCATION:
Bajo de Masinloc

CHINA:
CCG-3306
PLA-N 554
QIONG SANSHA YU 00206

INCIDENTS:

- a. Shadowing

DETAILS:

On 04 May, while approximately 25.0 nautical miles southeast of BdM, **CCG-3306, PLA-N 554, and QIONG SANSHA YU 00206** reportedly approached the FFB roughly 500.0 meters from its location, prompting the FFB to depart the area. The FFB was later shadowed by **QIONG SANSHA YU 00206** at a distance of 10.0 meters.

DATE:
05 May 2025

PHILIPPINES:
BRP DATU BANKAW
BRP DATU SUMKAD

LOCATION:
Bajo de Masinloc

CHINA:
CCG-3306
CCG-21558

INCIDENTS:

- a. Radio Challenges
- b. Sounding of horns/sirens
- c. Dangerous Maneuvers

DETAILS:

BFAR vessels **BRP DATU SUMKAD and BRP DATU BANKAW**, supported by PCG personnel onboard, were deployed to distribute fuel and relief goods for FFBs around 30.0 nautical miles east-northeast of the shoal on 05 May. **BRP DATU SUMKAD** vessel supplied provisions, including around 12 tons of fuel, to at least 11 FFBs.

BRP DATU SUMKAD engaged in at least two radio exchanges with **CCG-3306** and one with **CCG-21558**.





DATE:
15 to 26 May

LOCATION:
Bajo de Masinloc

PHILIPPINES:
BRP BAGACAY

CHINA:
CCG-3105
CCG-3301
CCG-21557
QIONG SAN SHA YU
00206

INCIDENTS:

- a. Shadowing
- b. Radio Challenges

DETAILS:

From 15 to 26 May, **BRP BAGACAY** conducted a MARPAT mission, during which it shadowed and monitored the activities of **CCG vessels 3105, 3301, and 21557**, as well as **CMM vessel QIONG SAN SHA YU 00206**.

BRP BAGACAY also engaged in a radio challenge exchange with **CCG vessels 3105 and 21557**. Its closest approach to the shoal is approximately 30.53 nautical miles east northeast on 18 May.

DATE:
21 May 2025

LOCATION:
Sand Cay 2,
Pag-asa Island

PHILIPPINES:
BRP DATU SANDAY
BRP DATU PAGBUAYA

CHINA:
CCG-5103
CCG-21559
PLA-N 161
CMM 00008
CMM 00115
CMM 00116
CMM 00209

INCIDENTS:

- a. Dangerous Maneuvers
- b. Use of Water Cannons

DETAILS:

BFAR vessels reached Pag-asa Cays to conduct MARPAT and sand sampling. Upon arrival, CCG-21559 conducted dangerous maneuvers and activated its water cannon hitting directly BRP DATU SANDAY. The same CCG vessel also collided with the BFAR vessel while they are located at approximately 0.6 nautical miles Southwest of Pag-asa Cay 2. This prompted the BFAR vessels to head back and shelter at the Pag-asa Island port.

DATE:
24 March 2025

LOCATION:
Bajo de Masinloc

PHILIPPINES:
BRP CABRA

CHINA:
CCG-3105
CCG-3305
CCG-21557
PLA-N 573

INCIDENTS:

- a. Shadowing
- b. Radio Challenges

DETAILS:

From 25 May to 02 June, **BRP CABRA** conducted a MARPAT mission, during which it shadowed and monitored the activities of **CCG vessels 3105, 3305, and 21557**, as well as **PLA-N ship 573**, and engaged in four radio challenge exchanges with **CCG-3105** and one with **21557**. Its closest approach to the shoal is roughly 32.8 nautical miles northeast on 28 May.

DATE:
02 to 08 June 2025

LOCATION:
Bajo de Masinloc

PHILIPPINES:
BRP BAGACAY

CHINA:
CCG-3105
CCG-3305
CCG-21557

INCIDENTS:

- a. Shadowing
- b. Radio Challenges

DETAILS:

From 02 to 08 June, **BRP BAGACAY** conducted a MARPAT mission, during which it shadowed and monitored the activities of **CCG vessels**



PLA-N 573
QIONG SANSHA YU
00316

3105, 3305, and 21557, PLA-N ship 573, and CMM vessel QIONG SANSHA YU 00316.

BRP BAGACAY also engaged in a radio challenge exchange with **CCG-21557**. Its closest approach to the shoal was approximately 32.5 nautical miles east-southeast of BdM on 05 June.

DATE:

08 June 2025

CHINA:

CMM QIONG LE YU
16838

INCIDENT:

a. CMM running aground

DETAILS:

PCG personnel stationed in Pag-asa monitored a CMM vessel, identified by bow number 16838, approximately one nautical mile from Pagasa Island. The said Chinese vessel was seen in an unusual position and location, likely driven into the shallow area due to adverse sea conditions, characterized by wave heights of 2-3 meters and strong winds.

Following PCG's mandate to safeguard the marine environment, PCG personnel reached out to the vessel to evaluate its condition and render support for its removal, aiming to prevent additional harm to the coral reef. However, the vessel did not respond to the PCG's inquiries. After approximately three (3) hours, the vessel was observed to have freed itself without external assistance.

LOCATION:

Pag-asa Island

DATE:

14 to 24
June 2025

PHILIPPINES:

BRP BAGACAY

INCIDENTS:

a. Radio Challenges

b. Sounding of horns/sirens

c. Dangerous Maneuvers

DETAILS:

BRP BAGACAY conducted a MARPAT mission from 14 to 24 June, during which the PCG vessel shadowed and monitored the activities of **CCG vessels 3104, 3105, 3305, 3306, 3502, and 4203, PLA-N 573, and CMM vessel QIONG SAN SHA YU 00113**. Its closest approach was around 30.0 nautical miles east-northeast of the shoal on 18 June.

LOCATION:

Bajo de Masinloc

CHINA:

CCG-3104

CCG-3105

CCG-3305

CCG-3306

CCG-3502

CCG-4203

PLA-N 573

CMM QIONG SAN SHA
YU 00113

DATE:

18 June 2025

PHILIPPINES:

FFB

INCIDENTS:

b. Sounding of horns/sirens

c. Blocking

DETAILS:

On 18 June, while 21.7 nautical miles southeast of BdM, **CCG-3305** reportedly blocked an **FFB**, 40.0 meters dead ahead while sounding its siren

LOCATION:

Bajo de Masinloc

CHINA:

CCG-3305





three times. This prompted the FFB to alter its course and head northeast.

DATE:

20 June 2025

LOCATION:

Bajo de Masinloc

PHILIPPINES:

BRP DATU TAMBLOT
BRP DATU MATANAM
TARADAPIT
BRP DATU BANKAYA
BRP DATU DAYA

CHINA:

CCG-3105
CCG-3305
CCG-4106
CCG-4203
PLA-N 573
PLA-N helicopter

INCIDENTS:

- a. Shadowing
- b. Radio Challenges
- c. Dangerous Maneuvers
- d. Use of Water Cannons

DETAILS:

On 20 June, BFAR vessels **BRP DATU TAMBLOT**, **BRP DATU MATANAM TARADAPIT**, **BRP DATU BANKAYA**, and **BRP DATU DAYA**, carried out a humanitarian mission. The BFAR vessels were met with an aggressive response from the CCG, marked by multiple radio challenges, dangerous maneuvers as close as 10.0 to 20.0 meters, and the use of water cannons, with water gusts from **CCG-4203** hitting the astern part of **BRP MATANAM TARADAPIT**.

DATE:

21 June 2025

LOCATION:

Bajo de Masinloc

PHILIPPINES:

FFB

CHINA:

PLA-N 573

INCIDENTS:

- a. Shadowing
- b. Sounding of horns/sirens
- c. Dangerous Maneuvers

DETAILS:

On 21 June, **PLA-N 573** reportedly approached an FFB at 300.0 meters portside and sounded its horn twice while 25.0 nautical miles northeast of BdM. This prompted the FFB to alter its course. **PLA-N 573** shadowed the FFB until it reached 28.0 nautical miles off the shoal.

DATE:

22 June to
03 July

LOCATION:

Bajo de Masinloc

PHILIPPINES:

BRP CABRA

CHINA:

CCG-3306
CCG-4203
CCG-5303
PLA-N 163
PLA-N 536
PLA-N 575

INCIDENTS:

- a. Shadowing
- b. Radio Challenges

DETAILS:

BRP CABRA conducted a MARPAT mission from 22 June to 03 July. The PCG vessel monitored the presence of **CCG vessels 3306, 4203, and 5303, PLA-N ships 163, 536, and 575.**

BRP CABRA engaged in one radio challenge exchange with **CCG-4203**. Its closest approach to BdM is around 30.0 nautical miles east of the shoal on 29 June.



**DATE:**

04 July 2025

PHILIPPINES:BRP TERESA
MAGBANUA**INCIDENTS:**

- a. Shadowing
- b. Sounding of horns/sirens
- c. Dangerous Maneuvers

LOCATION:

Bajo de Masinloc

CHINA:

CCG 5303

DETAILS:

At around 04 1020H July 2025 while patrolling in the West Philippine Sea near BdM, CCG 5303 conducted a dangerous maneuver approaching the port side of BRP TERESA MAGBANUA at 100 yards while blowing its horn.

DATE:

05 July 2025

PHILIPPINES:BRP TERESA
MAGBANUA**INCIDENTS:**

- a. Shadowing
- b. Dangerous Maneuvers

LOCATION:

Bajo de Masinloc

CHINA:CCG 4203
CCG 5301**DETAILS:**

At around 05 0946H July 2025 while patrolling in the West Philippine Sea near BdM, CCG vessels 4203 and 5301 approached BRP TERESA MAGBANUAN crossing from its starboard bow to port bow at 600 yards.

At around 0958H same date, CCG 4203 conducted another dangerous maneuver by crossing from BRP TERESA MAGBANUA's port bow to starboard bow port bow at 170 yards.

DATE:

06 July 2025

PHILIPPINES:

BRP MALAPASCUA

INCIDENTS:

- a. Deployment of Aerial Assets

LOCATION:

Kanduli Shoal

CHINA:PLA-N 168
PLA-N Helicopter TN 46**DETAILS:**

BRP MALAPASCUA departed from Buliluyan Port as part of its scheduled patrol to inspect Fish Aggregating Devices (FADs). Upon approaching the northern part of Kanduli Shoal, the PCG vessel spotted PLA-N 168. Shortly afterward, the PLA-N ship dispatched its aircraft with tail number 46.

It was seen hovering above the PCG vessel at a distance of approximately 100 meters and an altitude of 50 meters above sea level. The helicopter continued to circle Kanduli Shoal, monitoring and documenting the movements of BRP MALAPASCUA.

DATE:

12 to 15 July 2025

PHILIPPINES:BRP DATU DAYA
BRP DATU BANGKAYA**INCIDENTS:**


- a. Dangerous Maneuvers
- b. Use of Water Cannons

LOCATION:

Escoda Shoal

CHINA:PLA-N 620
CCG 5202
CCG 5306**DETAILS:**

BFAR deployed BRP DATU DAYA and BRP DATU BANGKAYA to the KIG. PLA-N 620 and CCG-5202 intercepted them as early as 24.06 nautical miles southeast of Escoda Shoal. As they approached the shoal, CCG-5306, 21549,





CCG 21549
CCG 21550

21550 appeared. CCG-5306 then activated its water cannon at the 16-nautical-mile mark.

PLA-N 620 participated in deterring the BFAR vessels by conducting dangerous maneuvers 300 meters forward bow of BRP DATU BANKAYA. Meanwhile, CCG-21549 closed to within 5.0 meters from the starboard side after breaching 14 nautical miles south of Escoda Shoal.

DATE:

16 July to 23 July 2025

PHILIPPINES:

BRP MELCHORA
AQUINO

INCIDENTS:

a. Shadowing

DETAILS:

The PCG dispatched BRP MELCHORA AQUINO to conduct maritime patrols in the vicinity of Kota Island and challenge the reported presence of CMM vessels ZHU DAN 5417 and YUE TAI YU 63168 and its sampans, along with SAI YANG DIAN, TAISHA 2999, and TAISHA 2585, which were observed upon the PCG vessel's arrival.

Initially, the PCG's presence went unchallenged, possibly delayed by weather disturbances. The CCG did not respond until 18 July, when CCG-5303 appeared in the area. PCG operations continued for a full week, during which BRP MELCHORA AQUINO repositioned regularly and issued daily radio challenges to the Chinese vessels. The mission officially concluded on 23 July following the dispersal of the VOIs through the PCG's use of a RHIB.

LOCATION:

Kota Island

CHINA:

ZHU DAN 5417
YUE TAI YU 63168
SAI YANG DIAN
TAISHA 2999
TAISHA 2585
CCG 5303

DATE:

31 July 2025

PHILIPPINES:

Tugboat Manuel 3
Barge Sea Asia 101

INCIDENTS:

a. Radio Challenges

b. Dangerous Maneuvers

DETAILS:

Government-contracted vessels Tugboat Manuel 3 and Barge Sea Asia 101 were reportedly approached and radio challenged by PLA-N 572 and 106 while underway approximately 22.9 nautical miles northeast of Escoda Shoal. According to the Captain of Tugboat Manuel 3, PLA-N 106 issued a radio challenge, requesting details on the type of cargo carried by Seasia 101, its flag state, the nationality of the crew, and port of destination.

Thereafter, PLAN 572 conducted close-quarter maneuvers, approaching to within roughly 500 meters of the port side of Manuel 3. This close shadowing reportedly lasted for about 20 minutes, and the radio challenge was repeated upon approach to the eastern part of Ayungin Shoal.

LOCATION:

Escoda Shoal

CHINA:

PLA-N 572
PLA-N 106

DATE:

02 August 2025

PHILIPPINES:

INCIDENTS:

a. Shadowing



LOCATION: Bajo de Masinloc	BRP TERESA MAGBANUA CHINA: CCG 5303	b. Blocking DETAILS: CCG 5303 blocked BRP TERESA MAGBANUA around 02 0820H August 2025 approx. 83.9 nautical miles northeast of BdM.
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DATE: 06 August 2025	PHILIPPINES: BRP DATU BALENSUSA BRP DATU ROMAPENET	INCIDENTS: a. Dangerous Maneuvers b. Blocking
LOCATION: Pag-asa Island Cays	CHINA: CCG 5103 CCG 4107 QIONG SANSHA YU 00121 QIONG SANSHA YU 00206	DETAILS: BFAR vessels BRP DATU BALENSUSA and BRP DATU ROMAPENET conducted patrols around Pag-asa Island, initially focusing on the Sandy Cays area upon arrival. They were immediately subjected to dangerous maneuvers and blocking attempts by both CCG and CMM vessels. CCG-5103 and 4107, working closely with CMM vessels QIONG SANSHA YU 00121 and QIONG SANSHA YU 00206 persistently blocked the BFAR vessels, with close approaches recorded at more or less 50 to 200 yards.

DATE: 08 August 2025	PHILIPPINES: BRP MELCHORA AQUINO	INCIDENTS: a. Shadowing
LOCATION: Panata Island (Near Zamora)	CHINA: CCG 4107 PLA-N 525	DETAILS: BRP MELCHORA AQUINO, while conducting a RORE mission, was persistently shadowed by CCG-4107 and encountered PLA-N 525 northwest of Panata Island. BRP MELCHORA AQUINO issued radio challenges to the PLA-N ship but received no reply. Only CCG-4107 responded with the following. CCG-4107: "PCG 9702 THIS IS CCG 4107 WE ARE CONDUCTING ROUTINE PATROL UNDER JURISDICTION WATERS. ALTER YOUR COURSE AND LEAVE THE AREA. PLEASE DO NOT INTERFERE WITH OUR BUSINESS."

DATE: 11 August 2025	PHILIPPINES: FFB	INCIDENTS: a. Sounding of horns/sirens
LOCATION: Bajo de Masinloc	CHINA: QIONG SANSHA YU 00208	DETAILS: On or about 11 0349H August while fishing in the West Philippine Sea near BDM, CMM QIONG SANSHA YU 00208 reportedly blew its horn towards an FFB at a distance of 100.0 meters; CMM QIONG SAN SHA YU 00204 carried out a similar action at 0602H.

DATE: 11 August 2025	PHILIPPINES: FFB	INCIDENTS: b. Blocking
LOCATION:	CHINA:	DETAILS:





Bajo de Masinloc

QIONG SANSHA YU
00109

On or about 11 0533H August, approximately 24.9NM southeast of BdM, CMM QIONG SANSHA YU 00109 reportedly blocked an FFB.

DATE:

11 August 2025

PHILIPPINES:

FFB

INCIDENTS:

b. Blocking

DETAILS:

LOCATION:

Bajo de Masinloc

CHINA:

CCG-4103

On or about 11 0700H August, roughly 25.75 nautical miles southeast of BdM, CCG-4103 and 3305 reportedly blocked an FFB at a distance of 300.0 meters.

DATE:

11 August 2025

PHILIPPINES:

FFB

INCIDENTS:

a. Shadowing

b. Dangerous Maneuvers

DETAILS:

LOCATION:

Bajo de Masinloc

CHINA:

CMM QIONG SANSHA
YU 00204

On or about 11 0555H August, around 20.4 nautical miles southeast of BdM, CMM QIONG SANSHA YU 00204 shadowed an FFB at 300.0 meters before executing a dangerous maneuver toward two (2) other FFBs in the area.

DATE:

11 August 2025

PHILIPPINES:

BRP TERESA
MAGBANUA

INCIDENTS:

a. Shadowing

b. Dangerous Maneuvers

c. Blocking

d. Use of Water Cannons

e. Collision

DETAILS:

LOCATION:

Bajo de Masinloc

BRP SULUAN

BRP DATU BANKAYA

BRP DATU SUMKAD

M/V MAMALAKAYA

CHINA:

PLA-N 164

CCG 3104

PCG deployed BRP TERESA MAGBANUA and BRP SULUAN near the vicinity waters of BdM on 11 August, together with the government-owned fish carrier M/V MAMALAKAYA, to assist local fisherfolk under the KBBM initiative.

Attempts by PCG and BFAR vessels to approach BdM were met with aggressive actions from Chinese entities. CCG-3104 and PLA-N 164 subjected BRP SULUAN to multiple blocking and dangerous maneuvers and a high-speed chase as it approached the 24.0 nautical mile mark of the shoal. CCG-3104 also engaged its water cannon. The pursuit culminated at 10.7 nautical miles east of BdM, BRP SULUAN's closest approach to BdM, when PLA-N 164 collided with CCG-3104 during a dangerous maneuver, causing heavy damage that rendered the CCG vessel unseaworthy.

DATE:

07 September 2025

PHILIPPINES:

M/Tug SELENE GULF
ARK STAR ENERGY

INCIDENTS:

b. Radio Challenges

DETAILS:

LOCATION:

PHILIPPINE COAST GUARD

Escoda Shoal

CHINA:
CCG 3302

On 07 September, the PCG received information that M/Tug SELENE GULF and barge ARK STAR ENERGY, also both government-contracted and en route to Pag-asa Island, were radio challenged by CCG 3302 approximately 12.44 nautical miles east-southeast of Escoda Shoal.

DATE:
16 September 2025

LOCATION:
Bajo de Masinloc

PHILIPPINES:
BRP CAPE SAN AGUSTIN
BRP GABRIELA SILANG
M/V MAMALAKAYA
10 BFAR vessels including BRP DATU GUMBAY PIANG

CHINA:
CCG 3302
CCG 3305
CCG 4202
CCG 5201
CCG 21559
CCG 21562
QIONG SAN SHA YU 00001
QIONG SAN SHA YU 00004

INCIDENTS:

- a. Shadowing
- b. Radio Challenges
- c. Dangerous Maneuvers
- d. Blocking
- e. Use of Water Cannons

DETAILS:

In support of the growing number of FFBs operating near BdM, the PCG, together with BFAR, activated the KBBM initiative on 16 September. To implement the program, the PCG deployed BRP CAPE SAN AGUSTIN (MRRV-4408), BRP CABRA (MRRV-4409), and BRP GABRIELA SILANG (OPV-8301), alongside the government-owned fish carrier M/V MAMALAKAYA and 10 BFAR vessels.

During the operations, the CCG subjected the BFAR vessels to illegal, coercive, aggressive, and deceptive (ICAD) actions. These included shadowing, radio challenges, blocking and dangerous maneuvers, and the use of water cannons. BRP DATU GUMBAY PIANG, in particular, sustained damages after being struck by high-pressure gusts from CCG-5201 water cannon, resulting in a broken bridge window and cabin partitions, and a short circuit in electrical outlets and outdoor air conditioning units. A BFAR personnel also suffered minor injuries.

DATE:
21 September 2025

LOCATION:
Escoda Shoal

PHILIPPINES:
BRP DATU MATANAM TARADAPIT
BRP DATU GUMBAY PIANG

CHINA:
PLA-N 163
CCG 5201
CCG 21550

INCIDENTS:

- a. Radio Challenges
- b. Dangerous Maneuvers
- c. Deployment of Aerial Assets
- d. Use of Water Cannons

DETAILS:

BRP DATU MATANAM TARADAPIT and BRP DATU GUMBAY PIANG conducted patrols approximately 26.78 nautical miles south of Escoda Shoal, when CCG 5201 initiated dangerous maneuvers. PLA-N 163 was also in the area at the time and launched a medium helicopter from 3.0 nautical miles off the starboard beam of BRP DATU MATANAM TARADAPIT.



Around 18.95 nautical miles southwest of Escoda Shoal, CCG 21550 joined the operation, closing to within 10 meters and engaging its water cannon (indirect) towards BRP DATU MATANAM TARADAPIT. It issued radio challenges, warning the BFAR vessels to alter their route.

DATE:

08 October 2025

LOCATION:

Bajo de Masinloc

PHILIPPINES:

M/V MAMALAKAYA

BRP DATU SANDAY

BRP DATU PAGBUAYA

BRP DATU BANKAW

BRP DATU BANKAYA

BRP DATU DAYA

BRP DATU DUMANGSIL

CHINA:

PLA-N 568

CCG 5201

CCG 21550

INCIDENTS:

a. Radio Challenges

b. Conduct of live fire exercises

DETAILS:

the PCG and BFAR activated the KBBM initiative and initially deployed government-owned fish carrier M/V MAMALAKAYA and six (6) BFAR vessels with PCG personnel onboard—to provide logistical support for Filipino fisherfolk, including fuel, crushed ice, groceries, and water.

PLA-N 568 conducted three radio broadcasts for all vessels in the area warning of apparent PLA-N live-fire exercises in the sea area east of BdM near the location of the Philippine contingent.

DATE:

08 October 2025

LOCATION:

Bajo de Masinloc

PHILIPPINES:

FFB

CHINA:

CCG 21542

Unidentified CCG vessel

INCIDENTS:

a. Shadowing

b. Sounding of horns/sirens

c. Driving-away

DETAILS:

O/A 08 1400H October, while approx. 30.0 NM southeast of BdM, **CCG 21542** approached an FFB and drove it away while sounding its siren and issuing verbal warnings in Chinese.

O/A 2100H, same date, at 20.0 NM west of BdM, the FFB was shadowed by an **unidentified CCG vessel** at 50.0 meters starboard beam, while also blowing its horn twice.

DATE:

08 October 2025

LOCATION:

Bajo de Masinloc

PHILIPPINES:

FFB

CHINA:

CCG 3106

Unidentified CMM vessel

INCIDENTS:

a. Shadowing

b. Use of searchlights

DETAILS:

O/A 08 2200H October, 13.0 nautical miles east of the southeast entrance of BdM, **CCG 3106** approached an FFB at 10.0 meters and reportedly pointed its searchlight. An **unidentified CMM vessel** also shadowed the FFB at 100.0 meters.

DATE:

PHILIPPINES:

INCIDENTS:

<p>12 October 2025</p> <p>LOCATION: Pag-asa Island</p>	<p>BRP DATU DAYA BRP DATU PAGBUAYA BRP DATU SANDay BRP DATU BANKAW</p> <p>CHINA: CCG 5102 CCG 23519 CCG 21559 CMM 00312</p>	<p>a. Dangerous Maneuvers b. Use of Water Cannons c. Ramming</p> <p>DETAILS: BFAR vessels BRP DATU DAYA, BRP DATU PAGBUAYA, BRP SANDAY, and BRP DATU BANKAW while conducting patrols were harassed by CCG vessels 5102, 21559, and 23519 and CMM vessel 00312, using water cannons, blocking, and dangerous maneuvers, culminating with CCG 21559 ramming BRP DATU PAGBUAYA approx. 2.8NM west of Pag-asa Island.</p>
<p>DATE: 15 October 2025</p> <p>LOCATION: Bajo de Masinloc</p>	<p>PHILIPPINES: FFB</p> <p>CHINA: CCG 4203</p>	<p>INCIDENTS: a. Shadowing b. Blocking</p> <p>DETAILS: O/A 15 1000H October, at 30.0 NM south of BdM, CCG 4203 shadowed and blocked and, while fixing its engine.</p>
<p>DATE: 23 October 2025</p> <p>LOCATION: Bajo de Masinloc</p>	<p>PHILIPPINES: FFB</p> <p>CHINA: Unidentified China vessel</p>	<p>INCIDENTS: a. Use of searchlights b. Driving-away</p> <p>DETAILS: On 23 2000H October, 25.0 nautical miles southeast of BdM, an unidentified vessel approached an FFB, pointed a searchlight toward it, and issued verbal warnings through a megaphone. This prompted the FFB to vacate the area and proceed toward its fish aggregating device (<i>payao</i>).</p>
<p>DATE: 31 October 2025</p> <p>LOCATION: Bajo de Masinloc</p>	<p>PHILIPPINES: FFB</p> <p>CHINA: PLA-N 627 CCG-4305</p>	<p>INCIDENTS: a. Shadowing b. Blocking c. Driving-away</p> <p>DETAILS: On 31 0900H October, 30.0 nautical miles west of BdM, PLA-N 627 reportedly approached, shadowed, and blocked an FFB. CCG-4305 later shadowed the FFB and issued verbal warnings using a megaphone until the FFB reached around 30.0 nautical miles southeast of BdM.</p>
<p>DATE: 06 December 2025</p> <p>LOCATION:</p>	<p>PHILIPPINES: BRP CAPE SAN AGUSTIN</p>	<p>INCIDENTS: a. Shadowing b. Dangerous Maneuvers</p> <p>DETAILS:</p>



de Masinloc

CHINA:
PLA-N 627
CCG-4305

On 05 0750H December 2025 approx. 50.49 nautical miles east off BdM, **CCG-3303** conducted a dangerous maneuver toward the PCG BRP CAPE SAN AGUSTIN by approaching from port to starboard bow approximately 0.7 nautical miles dead ahead.

DATE:
11 December 2025

PHILIPPINES:
BRP MALAPSCUA
M/V Lapu-Lapu

LOCATION:
Ayungin Shoal

CHINA:
CCG 23520
CCG 23519

DETAILS:
a. Sounding of horns/sirens
b. Use of Water Cannons

DETAILS:
The PCG directed BRP MALAPSCUA (MRRV-4403) to assist in the PN RORE Mission in Ayungin Shoal. As per the concept of operations, BRP MALAPSCUA was tasked with escorting M/V LAPU-LAPU to Ayungin Shoal. The PN RORE mission concluded successfully.

However, sudden aggression was noted around 13 to 12NM of Ayungin Shoal, where CCG vessels 23520 and 23519 blasted PCG with horns, blared their sirens, and activated their water cannons unprovoked.

DATE:
12 December 2025

PHILIPPINES:
20 FFBs

LOCATION:
Escoda Shoal

CHINA:
PLA-N 571
CCG 21562
CCG 21559
CCG 5009
CCG 3304
QIONG SANSHA YU 00104
QIONG SANSHA YU 00316
QIONG SANSHA YU 00122

INCIDENTS:
a. Sounding of horns/sirens
b. Dangerous Maneuvers
c. Cutting of Anchors
d. Use of Water Cannons

DETAILS:
20 Filipino Fishing Boats (FFBs) hailing from Quezon, Palawan ventured towards Escoda Shoal to conduct fishing activities after a period of consecutive adverse weather conditions in the KIG. Some FFBs were unable to approach the shoal due to a blockade imposed by CMM vessels, while those that managed to reach the area were reportedly tailed and, after anchoring in Escoda Shoal, were eventually driven away by the CCG and the PLA-N.

The CCG and CMM vessels utilized high-pressure water cannons, injuring three fishermen. Additionally, the CCG and PLA-N deployed RHIBs, which deliberately cut the anchor lines of several FFBs.





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